18 ideas
6334 | The function of the truth predicate? Understanding 'true'? Meaning of 'true'? The concept of truth? A theory of truth? [Horwich] |
6342 | Some correspondence theories concern facts; others are built up through reference and satisfaction [Horwich] |
6332 | The common-sense theory of correspondence has never been worked out satisfactorily [Horwich] |
6335 | The redundancy theory cannot explain inferences from 'what x said is true' and 'x said p', to p [Horwich] |
23299 | Horwich's deflationary view is novel, because it relies on propositions rather than sentences [Horwich, by Davidson] |
6336 | No deflationary conception of truth does justice to the fact that we aim for truth [Horwich] |
6337 | The deflationary picture says believing a theory true is a trivial step after believing the theory [Horwich] |
6344 | Truth is a useful concept for unarticulated propositions and generalisations about them [Horwich] |
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
6339 | Logical form is the aspects of meaning that determine logical entailments [Horwich] |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
16698 | Days exist, and yet they seem to be made up of parts which don't exist [Burley] |
16690 | Unlike permanent things, successive things cannot exist all at once [Burley] |
6338 | We could know the truth-conditions of a foreign sentence without knowing its meaning [Horwich] |
6340 | There are Fregean de dicto propositions, and Russellian de re propositions, or a mixture [Horwich] |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
6341 | Right translation is a mapping of languages which preserves basic patterns of usage [Horwich] |