15 ideas
6859 | Analytic philosophy has much higher standards of thinking than continental philosophy [Williamson] |
6862 | Fuzzy logic uses a continuum of truth, but it implies contradictions [Williamson] |
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
6858 | Formal logic struck me as exactly the language I wanted to think in [Williamson] |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
17435 | Objects do not naturally form countable units [Koslicki] |
17433 | We can still count squares, even if they overlap [Koslicki] |
17439 | There is no deep reason why we count carrots but not asparagus [Koslicki] |
17434 | We struggle to count branches and waves because our concepts lack clear boundaries [Koslicki] |
17436 | We talk of snow as what stays the same, when it is a heap or drift or expanse [Koslicki] |
6863 | Close to conceptual boundaries judgement is too unreliable to give knowledge [Williamson] |
6861 | What sort of logic is needed for vague concepts, and what sort of concept of truth? [Williamson] |
6860 | How can one discriminate yellow from red, but not the colours in between? [Williamson] |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |