17 ideas
| 18696 | The vagueness of truthmaker claims makes it easier to run anti-realist arguments [Button] |
| 18701 | The coherence theory says truth is coherence of thoughts, and not about objects [Button] |
| 11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
| 11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
| 11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
| 18694 | Permutation Theorem: any theory with a decent model has lots of models [Button] |
| 18692 | Realists believe in independent objects, correspondence, and fallibility of all theories [Button] |
| 18693 | Indeterminacy arguments say if a theory can be made true, it has multiple versions [Button] |
| 18695 | An ideal theory can't be wholly false, because its consistency implies a true model [Button] |
| 18700 | Cartesian scepticism doubts what is true; Kantian scepticism doubts that it is sayable [Button] |
| 18698 | Predictions give the 'content' of theories, which can then be 'equivalent' or 'adequate' [Button] |
| 18697 | A sentence's truth conditions are all the situations where it would be true [Button] |
| 11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
| 23896 | We see our character as a restricting limit, but also as an unshakable support [Weil] |
| 23894 | The concept of character is at the centre of morality [Weil] |
| 23893 | We don't see character in a single moment, but only over a period of time [Weil] |
| 23895 | We modify our character by placing ourselves in situations, or by attending to what seems trivial [Weil] |