16 ideas
11178 | The essence or definition of an essence involves either a class of properties or a class of propositions [Fine,K] |
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
12394 | If the result is bad, we change the rule; if we like the rule, we reject the result [Goodman] |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
11175 | Logical concepts rest on certain inferences, not on facts about implications [Fine,K] |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
11176 | The property of Property Abstraction says any suitable condition must imply a property [Fine,K] |
11174 | A logical truth is true in virtue of the nature of the logical concepts [Fine,K] |
14292 | Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice [Goodman] |
11177 | Can the essence of an object circularly involve itself, or involve another object? [Fine,K] |
11173 | Being a man is a consequence of his essence, not constitutive of it [Fine,K] |
11179 | If there are alternative definitions, then we have three possibilities for essence [Fine,K] |
18749 | Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised [Goodman, by Horsten/Pettigrew] |
17646 | Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form [Goodman, by Putnam] |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
4794 | We don't use laws to make predictions, we call things laws if we make predictions with them [Goodman] |