Combining Texts

All the ideas for '', 'The Philosophy of Mathematics' and 'Intensions Revisited'

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17 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
Quantified modal logic collapses if essence is withdrawn [Quine]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
ZF set theory has variables which range over sets, 'equals' and 'member', and extensionality [Dummett]
The main alternative to ZF is one which includes looser classes as well as sets [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Intuitionists reject excluded middle, not for a third value, but for possibility of proof [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt]
Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
First-order logic concerns objects; second-order adds properties, kinds, relations and functions [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Logical truths and inference are characterized either syntactically or semantically [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
Ordinals seem more basic than cardinals, since we count objects in sequence [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
The number 4 has different positions in the naturals and the wholes, with the same structure [Dummett]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Essences can make sense in a particular context or enquiry, as the most basic predicates [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Necessity is relative to context; it is what is assumed in an inquiry [Quine]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Possible worlds are a way to dramatise essentialism, and yet they presuppose essentialism [Quine]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
A rigid designator (for all possible worlds) picks out an object by its essential traits [Quine]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
Beliefs can be ascribed to machines [Quine]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt]