24 ideas
| 20320 | Truth is what unites, and the profound truths create a community [Jaspers] |
| 11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
| 11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
| 11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
| 20323 | Freedom needs knowledge, the possibility of arbitrariness, and law [Jaspers] |
| 20322 | I am aware that freedom is possible, and the freedom is not in theory, but in seeking freedom [Jaspers] |
| 11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
| 20324 | My freedom increases as I broaden my vision of possiblities and motives [Jaspers] |
| 20318 | My helplessness in philosophising reveals my being, and begins its upsurge [Jaspers] |
| 20321 | The struggle for Existenz is between people who are equals, and are utterly honest [Jaspers] |
| 20325 | Once we grasp freedom 'from' things, then freedom 'for' things becomes urgent [Jaspers] |
| 20317 | Mundane existence is general, falling under universals, but Existens is unique to individuals [Jaspers] |
| 20319 | We want the correct grasp on being that is neither solipsism nor absorption in the crowd [Jaspers] |
| 20315 | 'Existenz' is the potential being, which I could have, and ought to have [Jaspers] |
| 20316 | Every decision I make moves towards or away from fulfilled Existenz [Jaspers] |
| 8388 | Causation is either direct realism, Humean reduction, non-Humean reduction or theoretical realism [Tooley] |
| 8389 | Causation distinctions: reductionism/realism; Humean/non-Humean states; observable/non-observable [Tooley] |
| 8393 | We can only reduce the direction of causation to the direction of time if we are realist about the latter [Tooley] |
| 8390 | Causation is directly observable in pressure on one's body, and in willed action [Tooley] |
| 8392 | Probabilist laws are compatible with effects always or never happening [Tooley] |
| 8399 | The actual cause may not be the most efficacious one [Tooley] |
| 8391 | In counterfactual worlds there are laws with no instances, so laws aren't supervenient on actuality [Tooley] |
| 8394 | Explaining causation in terms of laws can't explain the direction of causation [Tooley] |
| 8398 | Causation is a concept of a relation the same in all worlds, so it can't be a physical process [Tooley] |