20 ideas
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
13134 | We negate predicates but do not negate names [Westerhoff] |
13117 | How far down before we are too specialised to have a category? [Westerhoff] |
13116 | Maybe objects in the same category have the same criteria of identity [Westerhoff] |
13118 | Categories are base-sets which are used to construct states of affairs [Westerhoff] |
13124 | Categories can be ordered by both containment and generality [Westerhoff] |
13125 | Categories are held to explain why some substitutions give falsehood, and others meaninglessness [Westerhoff] |
13126 | Categories systematize our intuitions about generality, substitutability, and identity [Westerhoff] |
13130 | Categories as generalities don't give a criterion for a low-level cut-off point [Westerhoff] |
13131 | The aim is that everything should belong in some ontological category or other [Westerhoff] |
13123 | All systems have properties and relations, and most have individuals, abstracta, sets and events [Westerhoff] |
13115 | Ontological categories are like formal axioms, not unique and with necessary membership [Westerhoff] |
13119 | Categories merely systematise, and are not intrinsic to objects [Westerhoff] |
13135 | A thing's ontological category depends on what else exists, so it is contingent [Westerhoff] |
13129 | Essential kinds may be too specific to provide ontological categories [Westerhoff] |
3161 | If mind is just an explanation, the explainer must have beliefs [Rey on Dennett] |
3177 | You couldn't drive a car without folk psychology [Dennett] |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |