Combining Texts

All the ideas for '', 'Why there isn't a ready-made world' and 'Freedom of the Will and concept of a person'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


16 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt]
The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Metaphysical realism is committed to there being one ultimate true theory [Putnam]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
It is an illusion to think there could be one good scientific theory of reality [Putnam]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
Shape is essential relative to 'statue', but not essential relative to 'clay' [Putnam]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
The old view that sense data are independent of mind is quite dotty [Putnam]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt]
A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action [Frankfurt]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt]
A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
An alien might think oxygen was the main cause of a forest fire [Putnam]