15 ideas
9161 | Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view [Field,H] |
19086 | Does the pragmatic theory of meaning support objective truth, or make it impossible? [Macbeth] |
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
19093 | Greek mathematics is wholly sensory, where ours is wholly inferential [Macbeth] |
9160 | Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible [Field,H] |
9164 | We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H] |
9165 | Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes [Field,H] |
9162 | Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that [Field,H] |
9166 | People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct' [Field,H] |
19091 | Seeing reality mathematically makes it an object of thought, not of experience [Macbeth] |
9163 | If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H] |
19088 | For pragmatists a concept means its consequences [Macbeth] |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |