34 ideas
2557 | Analytical philosophy seems to have little interest in how to tell a good analysis from a bad one [Rorty] |
3969 | There are no ultimate standards of rationality, since we only assess others by our own standard [Davidson] |
3972 | Truth and objectivity depend on a community of speakers to interpret what they mean [Davidson] |
2556 | Rational certainty may be victory in argument rather than knowledge of facts [Rorty] |
4726 | Rorty seems to view truth as simply being able to hold one's view against all comers [Rorty, by O'Grady] |
2549 | For James truth is "what it is better for us to believe" rather than a correct picture of reality [Rorty] |
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
2548 | If knowledge is merely justified belief, justification is social [Rorty] |
6599 | Knowing has no definable essence, but is a social right, found in the context of conversations [Rorty] |
2566 | You can't debate about whether to have higher standards for the application of words [Rorty] |
3960 | There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties [Davidson] |
2553 | The mind is a property, or it is baffling [Rorty] |
2550 | Pain lacks intentionality; beliefs lack qualia [Rorty] |
2554 | Is intentionality a special sort of function? [Rorty] |
3964 | If the mind is an anomaly, this makes reduction of the mental to the physical impossible [Davidson] |
3965 | Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world [Davidson] |
3961 | Obviously all mental events are causally related to physical events [Davidson] |
3963 | There are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical events [Davidson] |
3966 | The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism [Davidson] |
3967 | Absence of all rationality would be absence of thought [Davidson] |
3974 | Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant [Davidson] |
2565 | Nature has no preferred way of being represented [Rorty] |
2560 | Can meanings remain the same when beliefs change? [Rorty] |
2562 | A theory of reference seems needed to pick out objects without ghostly inner states [Rorty] |
2559 | Davidson's theory of meaning focuses not on terms, but on relations between sentences [Rorty] |
3968 | Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them [Davidson] |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
3970 | Thought is only fully developed if we communicate with others [Davidson] |
3971 | There is simply no alternative to the 'principle of charity' in interpreting what others do [Davidson] |
2558 | Since Hegel we have tended to see a human as merely animal if it is outside a society [Rorty] |
3973 | Without a teacher, the concept of 'getting things right or wrong' is meaningless [Davidson] |
3962 | Cause and effect relations between events must follow strict laws [Davidson] |