32 ideas
3972 | Truth and objectivity depend on a community of speakers to interpret what they mean [Davidson] |
3969 | There are no ultimate standards of rationality, since we only assess others by our own standard [Davidson] |
5331 | You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer] |
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
2611 | It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer] |
16520 | We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer] |
3960 | There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties [Davidson] |
2613 | The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer] |
5328 | Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer] |
5330 | Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer] |
5326 | Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer] |
5325 | Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer] |
5324 | Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer] |
5322 | Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer] |
5327 | Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer] |
3964 | If the mind is an anomaly, this makes reduction of the mental to the physical impossible [Davidson] |
3965 | Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world [Davidson] |
3961 | Obviously all mental events are causally related to physical events [Davidson] |
3963 | There are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical events [Davidson] |
3966 | The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism [Davidson] |
5329 | Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer] |
3967 | Absence of all rationality would be absence of thought [Davidson] |
3974 | Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant [Davidson] |
2610 | Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer] |
3968 | Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them [Davidson] |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
3970 | Thought is only fully developed if we communicate with others [Davidson] |
3971 | There is simply no alternative to the 'principle of charity' in interpreting what others do [Davidson] |
3973 | Without a teacher, the concept of 'getting things right or wrong' is meaningless [Davidson] |
3962 | Cause and effect relations between events must follow strict laws [Davidson] |