Combining Texts

All the ideas for '', 'Real Natures and Familiar Objects' and 'Necessary Beings'

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32 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
You cannot understand what exists without understanding possibility and necessity [Hale]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
A canonical defintion specifies the type of thing, and what distinguish this specimen [Hale]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
The two Barcan principles are easily proved in fairly basic modal logic [Hale]
With a negative free logic, we can dispense with the Barcan formulae [Hale]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
If second-order variables range over sets, those are just objects; properties and relations aren't sets [Hale]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention
Maybe conventionalism applies to meaning, but not to the truth of propositions expressed [Hale]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt]
Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
Unlike axiom proofs, natural deduction proofs needn't focus on logical truths and theorems [Hale]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
Add Hume's principle to logic, to get numbers; arithmetic truths rest on the nature of the numbers [Hale]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Interesting supervenience must characterise the base quite differently from what supervenes on it [Hale]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths
There is no gap between a fact that p, and it is true that p; so we only have the truth-condtions for p [Hale]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Properties only have identity in the context of their contraries [Elder]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
Maybe we should give up the statue [Elder]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
If a chair could be made of slightly different material, that could lead to big changes [Hale]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
The loss of an essential property means the end of an existence [Elder]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Essential properties by nature occur in clusters or packages [Elder]
Essential properties are bound together, and would be lost together [Elder]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Absolute necessities are necessarily necessary [Hale]
'Absolute necessity' is when there is no restriction on the things which necessitate p [Hale]
Logical and metaphysical necessities differ in their vocabulary, and their underlying entities [Hale]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Logical necessity is something which is true, no matter what else is the case [Hale]
Maybe each type of logic has its own necessity, gradually becoming broader [Hale]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
It seems that we cannot show that modal facts depend on non-modal facts [Hale]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
The big challenge for essentialist views of modality is things having necessary existence [Hale]
Essentialism doesn't explain necessity reductively; it explains all necessities in terms of a few basic natures [Hale]
If necessity derives from essences, how do we explain the necessary existence of essences? [Hale]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
What are these worlds, that being true in all of them makes something necessary? [Hale]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Possible worlds make every proposition true or false, which endorses classical logic [Hale]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
The molecules may explain the water, but they are not what 'water' means [Hale]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt]