15 ideas
| 2764 | Full coherence might involve consistency and mutual entailment of all propositions [Blanshard, by Dancy,J] |
| 18901 | Truthmakers are facts 'of' a domain, not something 'in' the domain [Sommers] |
| 19080 | Coherence tests for truth without implying correspondence, so truth is not correspondence [Blanshard, by Young,JO] |
| 18904 | 'Predicable' terms come in charged pairs, with one the negation of the other [Sommers, by Engelbretsen] |
| 18895 | Logic which maps ordinary reasoning must be transparent, and free of variables [Sommers] |
| 11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
| 18897 | Predicate logic has to spell out that its identity relation '=' is an equivalent relation [Sommers] |
| 18893 | Translating into quantificational idiom offers no clues as to how ordinary thinkers reason [Sommers] |
| 11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
| 11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
| 18903 | Sommers promotes the old idea that negation basically refers to terms [Sommers, by Engelbretsen] |
| 18894 | Predicates form a hierarchy, from the most general, down to names at the bottom [Sommers] |
| 18900 | Unfortunately for realists, modern logic cannot say that some fact exists [Sommers] |
| 18898 | In standard logic, names are the only way to refer [Sommers] |
| 11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |