32 ideas
| 17641 | Discoveries in mathematics can challenge philosophy, and offer it a new foundation [Russell] |
| 4739 | In "if and only if" (iff), "if" expresses the sufficient condition, and "only if" the necessary condition [Engel] |
| 17638 | If one proposition is deduced from another, they are more certain together than alone [Russell] |
| 17632 | Non-contradiction was learned from instances, and then found to be indubitable [Russell] |
| 4737 | Are truth-bearers propositions, or ideas/beliefs, or sentences/utterances? [Engel] |
| 4750 | The redundancy theory gets rid of facts, for 'it is a fact that p' just means 'p' [Engel] |
| 4744 | We can't explain the corresponding structure of the world except by referring to our thoughts [Engel] |
| 4738 | The coherence theory says truth is an internal relationship between groups of truth-bearers [Engel] |
| 4745 | Any coherent set of beliefs can be made more coherent by adding some false beliefs [Engel] |
| 4753 | Deflationism seems to block philosophers' main occupation, asking metatheoretical questions [Engel] |
| 4755 | Deflationism cannot explain why we hold beliefs for reasons [Engel] |
| 4751 | Maybe there is no more to be said about 'true' than there is about the function of 'and' in logic [Engel] |
| 11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
| 4752 | Deflationism must reduce bivalence ('p is true or false') to excluded middle ('p or not-p') [Engel] |
| 11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
| 11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
| 17629 | Which premises are ultimate varies with context [Russell] |
| 17630 | The sources of a proof are the reasons why we believe its conclusion [Russell] |
| 17640 | Finding the axioms may be the only route to some new results [Russell] |
| 17627 | It seems absurd to prove 2+2=4, where the conclusion is more certain than premises [Russell] |
| 17628 | Arithmetic was probably inferred from relationships between physical objects [Russell] |
| 4762 | The Humean theory of motivation is that beliefs may be motivators as well as desires [Engel] |
| 4754 | Our beliefs are meant to fit the world (i.e. be true), where we want the world to fit our desires [Engel] |
| 4763 | 'Evidentialists' say, and 'voluntarists' deny, that we only believe on the basis of evidence [Engel] |
| 17637 | The most obvious beliefs are not infallible, as other obvious beliefs may conflict [Russell] |
| 4746 | Pragmatism is better understood as a theory of belief than as a theory of truth [Engel] |
| 17639 | Believing a whole science is more than believing each of its propositions [Russell] |
| 4764 | We cannot directly control our beliefs, but we can control the causes of our involuntary beliefs [Engel] |
| 17631 | Induction is inferring premises from consequences [Russell] |
| 4759 | Mental states as functions are second-order properties, realised by first-order physical properties [Engel] |
| 11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
| 17633 | The law of gravity has many consequences beyond its grounding observations [Russell] |