Combining Texts

All the ideas for '', 'Human Knowledge: its scope and limits' and 'Ontological Dependence'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / c. Philosophy as generalisation
14255 We understand things through their dependency relations [Fine,K]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
14250 Metaphysics deals with the existence of things and with the nature of things [Fine,K]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
14259 Maybe two objects might require simultaneous real definitions, as with two simultaneous terms [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
11211 If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
11210 Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt]
11212 The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
16489 Is it possible to state every possible truth about the whole course of nature without using 'not'? [Russell]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / b. Being and existence
14253 An object's 'being' isn't existence; there's more to an object than existence, and its nature doesn't include existence [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
14261 There is 'weak' dependence in one definition, and 'strong' dependence in all the definitions [Fine,K]
14251 A natural modal account of dependence says x depends on y if y must exist when x does [Fine,K]
14257 An object depends on another if the second cannot be eliminated from the first's definition [Fine,K]
14254 Dependency is the real counterpart of one term defining another [Fine,K]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
14252 We should understand identity in terms of the propositions it renders true [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14256 How do we distinguish basic from derived esssences? [Fine,K]
14258 Maybe some things have essential relationships as well as essential properties [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
14260 An object only essentially has a property if that property follows from every definition of the object [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
16490 Some facts about experience feel like logical necessities [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
16488 It is hard to explain how a sentence like 'it is not raining' can be found true by observation [Russell]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
16491 If we define 'this is not blue' as disbelief in 'this is blue', we eliminate 'not' as an ingredient of facts [Russell]
11214 We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
4786 Russell's 'at-at' theory says motion is to be at the intervening points at the intervening instants [Russell, by Psillos]