16 ideas
| 15375 | If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting] |
| 15376 | Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting] |
| 15378 | Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting] |
| 15379 | Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting] |
| 11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
| 11026 | Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting] |
| 11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
| 11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
| 11028 | λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting] |
| 14919 | Empiricists deny what is unobservable, and reject objective modality [Fraassen] |
| 15377 | Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting] |
| 6783 | To 'accept' a theory is not to believe it, but to believe it empirically adequate [Fraassen, by Bird] |
| 14917 | To accept a scientific theory, we only need to believe that it is empirically adequate [Fraassen] |
| 6784 | Why should the true explanation be one of the few we have actually thought of? [Fraassen, by Bird] |
| 13066 | An explanation is just descriptive information answering a particular question [Fraassen, by Salmon] |
| 11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |