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All the ideas for '', 'The Problem of Knowledge' and 'Evidence'

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20 ideas

2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
Induction assumes some uniformity in nature, or that in some respects the future is like the past [Ayer]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt]
The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
Knowing I exist reveals nothing at all about my nature [Ayer]
To say 'I am not thinking' must be false, but it might have been true, so it isn't self-contradictory [Ayer]
'I know I exist' has no counterevidence, so it may be meaningless [Ayer]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
Internalists are much more interested in evidence than externalists are [McGrew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
Does spotting a new possibility count as evidence? [McGrew]
Absence of evidence proves nothing, and weird claims need special evidence [McGrew]
Every event is highly unlikely (in detail), but may be perfectly plausible [McGrew]
Criminal law needs two separate witnesses, but historians will accept one witness [McGrew]
Maybe all evidence consists of beliefs, rather than of facts [McGrew]
If all evidence is propositional, what is the evidence for the proposition? Do we face a regress? [McGrew]
Several unreliable witnesses can give good support, if they all say the same thing [McGrew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
Narrow evidentialism relies wholly on propositions; the wider form includes other items [McGrew]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
We only discard a hypothesis after one failure if it appears likely to keep on failing [Ayer]
Falsificationism would be naive if even a slight discrepancy in evidence killed a theory [McGrew]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
Induction passes from particular facts to other particulars, or to general laws, non-deductively [Ayer]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt]