Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Natural Kinds' and 'Things and Their Parts'

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28 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Philosophy is continuous with science, and has no external vantage point [Quine]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Part and whole contribute asymmetrically to one another, so must differ [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Klein summarised geometry as grouped together by transformations [Quine]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve [Quine]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
Hierarchical set membership models objects better than the subset or aggregate relations do [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
The matter is a relatively unstructured version of the object, like a set without membership structure [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
A 'temporary' part is a part at one time, but may not be at another, like a carburetor [Fine,K]
A 'timeless' part just is a part, not a part at some time; some atoms are timeless parts of a water molecule [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
An 'aggregative' sum is spread in time, and exists whenever a component exists [Fine,K]
An 'compound' sum is not spread in time, and only exists when all the components exists [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Two sorts of whole have 'rigid embodiment' (timeless parts) or 'variable embodiment' (temporary parts) [Fine,K]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method [Quine]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations [Quine]
Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause [Quine]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science [Quine]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
General terms depend on similarities among things [Quine]
To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour? [Quine]
Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped [Quine]
Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine [Quine]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer [Quine]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Quine probably regrets natural kinds now being treated as essences [Quine, by Dennett]
If similarity has no degrees, kinds cannot be contained within one another [Quine]
Comparative similarity allows the kind 'colored' to contain the kind 'red' [Quine]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle [Quine]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
It is hard to see how regularities could be explained [Quine]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 3. Deism
Clearly the gods ignore human affairs, or they would have given us justice [Thrasymachus]