117 ideas
| 11300 | Agathon: good [PG] |
| 11301 | Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness [PG] |
| 11302 | Aitia / aition: cause, explanation [PG] |
| 11303 | Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will [PG] |
| 11304 | Aletheia: truth [PG] |
| 11305 | Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance [PG] |
| 11306 | Ananke: necessity [PG] |
| 11307 | Antikeimenon: object [PG] |
| 11375 | Apatheia: unemotional [PG] |
| 11308 | Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite [PG] |
| 11376 | Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction [PG] |
| 11309 | Apodeixis: demonstration [PG] |
| 11310 | Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly [PG] |
| 11311 | Arche: first principle, the basic [PG] |
| 11312 | Arete: virtue, excellence [PG] |
| 11313 | Chronismos: separation [PG] |
| 11314 | Diairesis: division [PG] |
| 11315 | Dialectic: dialectic, discussion [PG] |
| 11316 | Dianoia: intellection [cf. Noesis] [PG] |
| 11317 | Diaphora: difference [PG] |
| 11318 | Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice [PG] |
| 11319 | Doxa: opinion, belief [PG] |
| 11320 | Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity [PG] |
| 11321 | Eidos: form, idea [PG] |
| 11322 | Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation [PG] |
| 11323 | Empeiron: experience [PG] |
| 11324 | Energeia: employment, actuality, power? [PG] |
| 11325 | Enkrateia: control [PG] |
| 11326 | Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end [PG] |
| 11327 | Epagoge: induction, explanation [PG] |
| 11328 | Episteme: knowledge, understanding [PG] |
| 11329 | Epithumia: appetite [PG] |
| 11330 | Ergon: function [PG] |
| 11331 | Eristic: polemic, disputation [PG] |
| 11332 | Eros: love [PG] |
| 11333 | Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment [PG] |
| 11334 | Genos: type, genus [PG] |
| 11335 | Hexis: state, habit [PG] |
| 11336 | Horismos: definition [PG] |
| 11337 | Hule: matter [PG] |
| 11338 | Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing [cf. Tode ti] [PG] |
| 11339 | Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility [PG] |
| 11340 | Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially [PG] |
| 11341 | Kinesis: movement, process [PG] |
| 11342 | Kosmos: order, universe [PG] |
| 11343 | Logos: reason, account, word [PG] |
| 11344 | Meson: the mean [PG] |
| 11345 | Metechein: partaking, sharing [PG] |
| 11377 | Mimesis: imitation, fine art [PG] |
| 11346 | Morphe: form [PG] |
| 11347 | Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia] [PG] |
| 11348 | Nomos: convention, law, custom [PG] |
| 11349 | Nous: intuition, intellect, understanding [PG] |
| 11350 | Orexis: desire [PG] |
| 11351 | Ousia: substance, (primary) being, [see 'Prote ousia'] [PG] |
| 11352 | Pathos: emotion, affection, property [PG] |
| 11353 | Phantasia: imagination [PG] |
| 11354 | Philia: friendship [PG] |
| 11355 | Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom [PG] |
| 11356 | Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense [PG] |
| 11357 | Physis: nature [PG] |
| 11358 | Praxis: action, activity [PG] |
| 11359 | Prote ousia: primary being [PG] |
| 11360 | Psuche: mind, soul, life [PG] |
| 11361 | Sophia: wisdom [PG] |
| 11362 | Sophrosune: moderation, self-control [PG] |
| 11363 | Stoicheia: elements [PG] |
| 11364 | Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism [PG] |
| 11365 | Techne: skill, practical knowledge [PG] |
| 11366 | Telos: purpose, end [PG] |
| 11367 | Theoria: contemplation [PG] |
| 11368 | Theos: god [PG] |
| 11369 | Ti esti: what-something-is, essence [PG] |
| 11370 | Timoria: vengeance, punishment [PG] |
| 11371 | To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be [PG] |
| 11372 | To ti estin: essence [PG] |
| 11373 | Tode ti: this-such, subject of predication [cf. hupokeimenon] [PG] |
| 16227 | Philosophers are good at denying the obvious [Hawley] |
| 16216 | Part of the sense of a proper name is a criterion of the thing's identity [Hawley] |
| 16211 | A homogeneous rotating disc should be undetectable according to Humean supervenience [Hawley] |
| 16219 | Non-linguistic things cannot be indeterminate, because they don't have truth-values at all [Hawley] |
| 16223 | Maybe for the world to be vague, it must be vague in its foundations? [Hawley] |
| 16226 | Epistemic vagueness seems right in the case of persons [Hawley] |
| 16208 | Supervaluation refers to one vaguely specified thing, through satisfaction by everything in some range [Hawley] |
| 16221 | Supervaluationism takes what the truth-value would have been if indecision was resolved [Hawley] |
| 16230 | Maybe the only properties are basic ones like charge, mass and spin [Hawley] |
| 16232 | An object is 'natural' if its stages are linked by certain non-supervenient relations [Hawley] |
| 16200 | Are sortals spatially maximal - so no cat part is allowed to be a cat? [Hawley] |
| 16237 | The modal features of statue and lump are disputed; when does it stop being that statue? [Hawley] |
| 16238 | Perdurantists can adopt counterpart theory, to explain modal differences of identical part-sums [Hawley] |
| 16220 | Vagueness is either in our knowledge, in our talk, or in reality [Hawley] |
| 16222 | Indeterminacy in objects and in properties are not distinct cases [Hawley] |
| 16228 | The constitution theory is endurantism plus more than one object in a place [Hawley] |
| 16229 | Constitution theory needs sortal properties like 'being a sweater' to distinguish it from its thread [Hawley] |
| 14492 | If the constitution view says thread and sweater are two things, why do we talk of one thing? [Hawley] |
| 16193 | 'Adverbialism' explains change by saying an object has-at-some-time a given property [Hawley] |
| 16195 | Presentism solves the change problem: the green banana ceases, so can't 'relate' to the yellow one [Hawley] |
| 16202 | The problem of change arises if there must be 'identity' of a thing over time [Hawley] |
| 16192 | Endurance theory can relate properties to times, or timed instantiations to properties [Hawley] |
| 16196 | Endurance is a sophisticated theory, covering properties, instantiation and time [Hawley] |
| 16197 | How does perdurance theory explain our concern for our own future selves? [Hawley] |
| 16191 | Perdurance needs an atemporal perspective, to say that the object 'has' different temporal parts [Hawley] |
| 16199 | If an object is the sum of all of its temporal parts, its mass is staggeringly large! [Hawley] |
| 16201 | Perdurance says things are sums of stages; Stage Theory says each stage is the thing [Hawley] |
| 16240 | If a life is essentially the sum of its temporal parts, it couldn't be shorter or longer than it was? [Hawley] |
| 16203 | Stage Theory seems to miss out the link between stages of the same object [Hawley] |
| 16204 | Stage Theory says every stage is a distinct object, which gives too many objects [Hawley] |
| 16212 | An isolated stage can't be a banana (which involves suitable relations to other stages) [Hawley] |
| 16213 | Stages of one thing are related by extrinsic counterfactual and causal relations [Hawley] |
| 16206 | Stages must be as fine-grained in length as change itself, so any change is a new stage [Hawley] |
| 16205 | The stages of Stage Theory seem too thin to populate the world, or to be referred to [Hawley] |
| 16225 | If two things might be identical, there can't be something true of one and false of the other [Hawley] |
| 16239 | To decide whether something is a counterpart, we need to specify a relevant sortal concept [Hawley] |
| 16218 | On any theory of self, it is hard to explain why we should care about our future selves [Hawley] |
| 16215 | Causation is nothing more than the counterfactuals it grounds? [Hawley] |
| 16207 | Time could be discrete (like integers) or dense (rationals) or continuous (reals) [Hawley] |
| 1558 | Clearly the gods ignore human affairs, or they would have given us justice [Thrasymachus] |