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All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers' and 'On Second-Order Logic'

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 2. Ancient Thought
Thales was the first western thinker to believe the arché was intelligible [Roochnik on Thales]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
The nominalist is tied by standard semantics to first-order, denying higher-order abstracta [Marcus (Barcan)]
Boolos reinterprets second-order logic as plural logic [Boolos, by Oliver/Smiley]
Second-order logic metatheory is set-theoretic, and second-order validity has set-theoretic problems [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
A sentence can't be a truth of logic if it asserts the existence of certain sets [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Nominalists see proper names as a main vehicle of reference [Marcus (Barcan)]
Anything which refers tends to be called a 'name', even if it isn't a noun [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Nominalists should quantify existentially at first-order, and substitutionally when higher [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
Quantifiers are needed to refer to infinitely many objects [Marcus (Barcan)]
Substitutional semantics has no domain of objects, but place-markers for substitutions [Marcus (Barcan)]
'∀x x=x' only means 'everything is identical to itself' if the range of 'everything' is fixed [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
Maybe a substitutional semantics for quantification lends itself to nominalism [Marcus (Barcan)]
A true universal sentence might be substitutionally refuted, by an unnamed denumerable object [Marcus (Barcan)]
Substitutional language has no ontology, and is just a way of speaking [Marcus (Barcan)]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
Weak completeness: if it is valid, it is provable. Strong: it is provable from a set of sentences [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
Why should compactness be definitive of logic? [Boolos, by Hacking]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / e. Peano arithmetic 2nd-order
Many concepts can only be expressed by second-order logic [Boolos]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
Is being just referent of the verb 'to be'? [Marcus (Barcan)]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
Nominalists say predication is relations between individuals, or deny that it refers [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
If objects are thoughts, aren't we back to psychologism? [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
Substitutivity won't fix identity, because expressions may be substitutable, but not refer at all [Marcus (Barcan)]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
Nothing is stronger than necessity, which rules everything [Thales, by Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / c. Ultimate substances
Thales said water is the first principle, perhaps from observing that food is moist [Thales, by Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
Thales must have thought soul causes movement, since he thought magnets have soul [Thales, by Aristotle]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
Thales said the gods know our wrong thoughts as well as our evil actions [Thales, by Diog. Laertius]