68 ideas
1597 | Thales was the first western thinker to believe the arché was intelligible [Roochnik on Thales] |
12667 | Metaphysics aims at the simplest explanation, without regard to testability [Ellis] |
11912 | Substantive metaphysics says what a property is, not what a predicate means [Molnar] |
11920 | A real definition gives all the properties that constitute an identity [Molnar] |
12666 | We can base logic on acceptability, and abandon the Fregean account by truth-preservation [Ellis] |
12688 | Mathematics is the formal study of the categorical dimensions of things [Ellis] |
12683 | Objects and substances are a subcategory of the natural kinds of processes [Ellis] |
12670 | A physical event is any change of distribution of energy [Ellis] |
11919 | Ontological dependence rests on essential connection, not necessary connection [Molnar] |
11929 | The three categories in ontology are objects, properties and relations [Molnar] |
11927 | Reflexive relations are syntactically polyadic but ontologically monadic [Molnar] |
11915 | If atomism is true, then all properties derive from ultimate properties [Molnar] |
12673 | Physical properties are those relevant to how a physical system might act [Ellis] |
11916 | 'Being physical' is a second-order property [Molnar] |
12665 | I support categorical properties, although most people only want causal powers [Ellis] |
12682 | Essentialism needs categorical properties (spatiotemporal and numerical relations) and dispositions [Ellis] |
12684 | Spatial, temporal and numerical relations have causal roles, without being causal [Ellis] |
11956 | 'Categorical properties' are those which are not powers [Molnar] |
12672 | Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals [Ellis] |
11928 | Are tropes transferable? If they are, that is a version of Platonism [Molnar] |
11933 | A power's type-identity is given by its definitive manifestation [Molnar] |
11932 | Powers have Directedness, Independence, Actuality, Intrinsicality and Objectivity [Molnar] |
12676 | Causal powers can't rest on things which lack causal power [Ellis] |
11934 | The physical world has a feature very like mental intentionality [Molnar] |
11947 | Dispositions and external powers arise entirely from intrinsic powers in objects [Molnar] |
11953 | Some powers are ungrounded, and others rest on them, and are derivative [Molnar] |
11952 | The Standard Model suggest that particles are entirely dispositional, and hence are powers [Molnar] |
23781 | Categoricals exist to influence powers. Such as structures, orientations and magnitudes [Ellis, by Williams,NE] |
11943 | Dispositions can be causes, so they must be part of the actual world [Molnar] |
12686 | Causal powers are a proper subset of the dispositional properties [Ellis] |
11939 | If powers only exist when actual, they seem to be nomadic, and indistinguishable from non-powers [Molnar] |
11914 | Platonic explanations of universals actually diminish our understanding [Molnar] |
11913 | For nominalists, predicate extensions are inexplicable facts [Molnar] |
11962 | Nominalists only accept first-order logic [Molnar] |
12685 | Categorical properties depend only on the structures they represent [Ellis] |
11917 | Structural properties are derivate properties [Molnar] |
11955 | There are no 'structural properties', as properties with parts [Molnar] |
12679 | A real essence is a kind's distinctive properties [Ellis] |
11918 | The essence of a thing need not include everything that is necessarily true of it [Molnar] |
12668 | Metaphysical necessity holds between things in the world and things they make true [Ellis] |
11963 | What is the truthmaker for a non-existent possible? [Molnar] |
12687 | Metaphysical necessities are those depending on the essential nature of things [Ellis] |
3013 | Nothing is stronger than necessity, which rules everything [Thales, by Diog. Laertius] |
12669 | Science aims to explain things, not just describe them [Ellis] |
11951 | Hume allows interpolation, even though it and extrapolation are not actually valid [Molnar] |
11936 | The two ways proposed to distinguish mind are intentionality or consciousness [Molnar] |
11935 | Physical powers like solubility and charge also have directedness [Molnar] |
11944 | Rule occasionalism says God's actions follow laws, not miracles [Molnar] |
1494 | Thales said water is the first principle, perhaps from observing that food is moist [Thales, by Aristotle] |
12681 | There are natural kinds of processes [Ellis] |
12680 | Natural kind structures go right down to the bottom level [Ellis] |
11960 | Singular causation is prior to general causation; each aspirin produces the aspirin generalization [Molnar] |
11937 | We should analyse causation in terms of powers, not vice versa [Molnar] |
11954 | We should analyse causation in terms of powers [Molnar] |
11961 | Causal dependence explains counterfactual dependence, not vice versa [Molnar] |
12675 | Laws of nature are just descriptions of how things are disposed to behave [Ellis] |
11959 | Science works when we assume natural kinds have essences - because it is true [Molnar] |
9448 | Location in space and time are non-power properties [Molnar, by Mumford] |
11930 | One essential property of a muon doesn't entail the others [Molnar] |
11957 | It is contingent which kinds and powers exist in the world [Molnar] |
11921 | The laws of nature depend on the powers, not the other way round [Molnar] |
1713 | Thales must have thought soul causes movement, since he thought magnets have soul [Thales, by Aristotle] |
12671 | I deny forces as entities that intervene in causation, but are not themselves causal [Ellis] |
12674 | Energy is the key multi-valued property, vital to scientific realism [Ellis] |
11931 | Energy fields are discontinuous at the very small [Molnar] |
12689 | Simultaneity can be temporal equidistance from the Big Bang [Ellis] |
12690 | The present is the collapse of the light wavefront from the Big Bang [Ellis] |
1742 | Thales said the gods know our wrong thoughts as well as our evil actions [Thales, by Diog. Laertius] |