84 ideas
1597 | Thales was the first western thinker to believe the arché was intelligible [Roochnik on Thales] |
16539 | A definition of a circle will show what it is, and show its generating principle [Lowe] |
16540 | Defining an ellipse by conic sections reveals necessities, but not the essence of an ellipse [Lowe] |
16548 | An essence is what an entity is, revealed by a real definition; this is not an entity in its own right [Lowe] |
16549 | Simple things like 'red' can be given real ostensive definitions [Lowe] |
3137 | Varieties of singular terms are used to designate token particulars [Rey] |
3143 | Physics requires the existence of properties, and also the abstract objects of arithmetic [Rey] |
16545 | The essence of lumps and statues shows that two objects coincide but are numerically distinct [Lowe] |
16546 | The essence of a bronze statue shows that it could be made of different bronze [Lowe] |
16551 | Grasping an essence is just grasping a real definition [Lowe] |
16542 | Explanation can't give an account of essence, because it is too multi-faceted [Lowe] |
16552 | If we must know some entity to know an essence, we lack a faculty to do that [Lowe] |
3145 | The Indiscernibility of Identicals is a truism; but the Identity of Indiscernibles depends on possible identical worlds [Rey] |
16533 | Logical necessities, based on laws of logic, are a proper sub-class of metaphysical necessities [Lowe] |
16531 | 'Metaphysical' necessity is absolute and objective - the strongest kind of necessity [Lowe] |
16532 | 'Epistemic' necessity is better called 'certainty' [Lowe] |
3013 | Nothing is stronger than necessity, which rules everything [Thales, by Diog. Laertius] |
16543 | If an essence implies p, then p is an essential truth, and hence metaphysically necessary [Lowe] |
16544 | Metaphysical necessity is either an essential truth, or rests on essential truths [Lowe] |
16538 | We could give up possible worlds if we based necessity on essences [Lowe] |
3172 | Empiricism says experience is both origin and justification of all knowledge [Rey] |
16534 | 'Intuitions' are just unreliable 'hunches'; over centuries intuitions change enormously [Lowe] |
3166 | Animal learning is separate from their behaviour [Rey] |
3232 | Abduction could have true data and a false conclusion, and may include data not originally mentioned [Rey] |
3128 | It's not at all clear that explanation needs to stop anywhere [Rey] |
3136 | The three theories are reduction, dualism, eliminativism [Rey] |
3141 | Is consciousness 40Hz oscillations in layers 5 and 6 of the visual cortex? [Rey] |
3148 | Dualist privacy is seen as too deep for even telepathy to reach [Rey] |
3164 | Intentional explanations are always circular [Rey] |
3138 | Arithmetic and unconscious attitudes have no qualia [Rey] |
3142 | Why qualia, and why this particular quale? [Rey] |
3224 | If qualia have no function, their attachment to thoughts is accidental [Rey] |
3227 | Are qualia a type of propositional attitude? [Rey] |
3226 | Are qualia irrelevant to explaining the mind? [Rey] |
3229 | If colour fits a cone mapping hue, brightness and saturation, rotating the cone could give spectrum inversion [Rey] |
3223 | Self-consciousness may just be nested intentionality [Rey] |
3162 | Experiments prove that people are often unaware of their motives [Rey] |
3163 | Brain damage makes the unreliability of introspection obvious [Rey] |
3196 | Free will isn't evidence against a theory of thought if there is no evidence for free will [Rey] |
3195 | If reason could be explained in computational terms, there would be no need for the concept of 'free will' [Rey] |
3180 | Maybe behaviourists should define mental states as a group [Rey] |
3165 | Behaviourism is eliminative, or reductionist, or methodological [Rey] |
3167 | Animals don't just respond to stimuli, they experiment [Rey] |
3173 | How are stimuli and responses 'similar'? [Rey] |
3179 | Behaviour is too contingent and irrelevant to be the mind [Rey] |
3186 | If a normal person lacked a brain, would you say they had no mind? [Rey] |
3127 | Dualism and physicalism explain nothing, and don't suggest any research [Rey] |
3188 | Homuncular functionalism (e.g. Freud) could be based on simpler mechanical processes [Rey] |
3216 | Is the room functionally the same as a Chinese speaker? [Rey] |
3220 | Searle is guilty of the fallacy of division - attributing a property of the whole to a part [Rey] |
3206 | One computer program could either play chess or fight a war [Rey] |
3134 | Human behaviour can show law-like regularity, which eliminativism can't explain [Rey] |
3140 | If you explain water as H2O, you have reduced water, but not eliminated it [Rey] |
3199 | Connectionism assigns numbers to nodes and branches, and plots the outcomes [Rey] |
3201 | Connectionism explains well speed of perception and 'graceful degradation' [Rey] |
3202 | Connectionism explains irrationality (such as the Gamblers' Fallacy) quite well [Rey] |
3200 | Pattern recognition is puzzling for computation, but makes sense for connectionism [Rey] |
3150 | Can identity explain reason, free will, non-extension, intentionality, subjectivity, experience? [Rey] |
3129 | Physicalism offers something called "complexity" instead of mental substance [Rey] |
3139 | Some attitudes are information (belief), others motivate (hatred) [Rey] |
3174 | Good grammar can't come simply from stimuli [Rey] |
3171 | Children speak 90% good grammar [Rey] |
3213 | Animals may also use a language of thought [Rey] |
3170 | We train children in truth, not in grammar [Rey] |
3215 | Images can't replace computation, as they need it [Rey] |
3194 | CRTT is good on deduction, but not so hot on induction, abduction and practical reason [Rey] |
3147 | Problem-solving clearly involves manipulating images [Rey] |
3175 | Animals map things over time as well as over space [Rey] |
3207 | Simple externalism is that the meaning just is the object [Rey] |
16535 | A concept is a way of thinking of things or kinds, whether or not they exist [Lowe] |
3176 | Anything bears a family resemblance to a game, but obviously not anything counts as one [Rey] |
3181 | A one hour gap in time might be indirectly verified, but then almost anything could be [Rey] |
3204 | The meaning of "and" may be its use, but not of "animal" [Rey] |
3205 | Semantic holism means new evidence for a belief changes the belief, and we can't agree on concepts [Rey] |
16550 | Direct reference doesn't seem to require that thinkers know what it is they are thinking about [Lowe] |
3209 | Causal theories of reference (by 'dubbing') don't eliminate meanings in the heads of dubbers [Rey] |
3210 | If meaning and reference are based on causation, then virtually everything has meaning [Rey] |
3149 | Referential Opacity says truth is lost when you substitute one referring term ('mother') for another ('Jocasta') [Rey] |
3169 | A simple chaining device can't build sentences containing 'either..or', or 'if..then' [Rey] |
3221 | Our desires become important when we have desires about desires [Rey] |
1494 | Thales said water is the first principle, perhaps from observing that food is moist [Thales, by Aristotle] |
16547 | H2O isn't necessary, because different laws of nature might affect how O and H combine [Lowe] |
1713 | Thales must have thought soul causes movement, since he thought magnets have soul [Thales, by Aristotle] |
1742 | Thales said the gods know our wrong thoughts as well as our evil actions [Thales, by Diog. Laertius] |