34 ideas
1597 | Thales was the first western thinker to believe the arché was intelligible [Roochnik on Thales] |
3972 | Truth and objectivity depend on a community of speakers to interpret what they mean [Davidson] |
3969 | There are no ultimate standards of rationality, since we only assess others by our own standard [Davidson] |
18781 | Inconsistency doesn't prevent us reasoning about some system [Mares] |
18789 | Intuitionist logic looks best as natural deduction [Mares] |
18790 | Intuitionism as natural deduction has no rule for negation [Mares] |
18787 | Three-valued logic is useful for a theory of presupposition [Mares] |
18793 | Material implication (and classical logic) considers nothing but truth values for implications [Mares] |
18784 | In classical logic the connectives can be related elegantly, as in De Morgan's laws [Mares] |
18780 | Standard disjunction and negation force us to accept the principle of bivalence [Mares] |
18786 | Excluded middle standardly implies bivalence; attacks use non-contradiction, De M 3, or double negation [Mares] |
18782 | The connectives are studied either through model theory or through proof theory [Mares] |
18783 | Many-valued logics lack a natural deduction system [Mares] |
18792 | Situation semantics for logics: not possible worlds, but information in situations [Mares] |
18785 | Consistency is semantic, but non-contradiction is syntactic [Mares] |
18788 | For intuitionists there are not numbers and sets, but processes of counting and collecting [Mares] |
3013 | Nothing is stronger than necessity, which rules everything [Thales, by Diog. Laertius] |
3960 | There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties [Davidson] |
3964 | If the mind is an anomaly, this makes reduction of the mental to the physical impossible [Davidson] |
3965 | Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world [Davidson] |
3961 | Obviously all mental events are causally related to physical events [Davidson] |
3963 | There are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical events [Davidson] |
3966 | The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism [Davidson] |
3967 | Absence of all rationality would be absence of thought [Davidson] |
3974 | Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant [Davidson] |
18791 | In 'situation semantics' our main concepts are abstracted from situations [Mares] |
3968 | Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them [Davidson] |
3970 | Thought is only fully developed if we communicate with others [Davidson] |
3971 | There is simply no alternative to the 'principle of charity' in interpreting what others do [Davidson] |
3973 | Without a teacher, the concept of 'getting things right or wrong' is meaningless [Davidson] |
1494 | Thales said water is the first principle, perhaps from observing that food is moist [Thales, by Aristotle] |
3962 | Cause and effect relations between events must follow strict laws [Davidson] |
1713 | Thales must have thought soul causes movement, since he thought magnets have soul [Thales, by Aristotle] |
1742 | Thales said the gods know our wrong thoughts as well as our evil actions [Thales, by Diog. Laertius] |