Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Theory of Logical Types' and 'The Limits of Contingency'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 2. Ancient Thought
1597 Thales was the first western thinker to believe the arché was intelligible [Roochnik on Thales]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / c. Axiom of Pairing II
18851 Pairing (with Extensionality) guarantees an infinity of sets, just from a single element [Rosen]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
21566 'Propositional functions' are ambiguous until the variable is given a value [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
21567 'All judgements made by Epimenedes are true' needs the judgements to be of the same type [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
23457 Type theory cannot identify features across levels (because such predicates break the rules) [Morris,M on Russell]
21556 Classes are defined by propositional functions, and functions are typed, with an axiom of reducibility [Russell, by Lackey]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / d. Predicativism
21568 A one-variable function is only 'predicative' if it is one order above its arguments [Russell]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
18852 A Meinongian principle might say that there is an object for any modest class of properties [Rosen]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
18850 'Metaphysical' modality is the one that makes the necessity or contingency of laws of nature interesting [Rosen]
18849 Metaphysical necessity is absolute and universal; metaphysical possibility is very tolerant [Rosen]
18857 Standard Metaphysical Necessity: P holds wherever the actual form of the world holds [Rosen]
18858 Sets, universals and aggregates may be metaphysically necessary in one sense, but not another [Rosen]
18856 Non-Standard Metaphysical Necessity: when ¬P is incompatible with the nature of things [Rosen]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
18848 Something may be necessary because of logic, but is that therefore a special sort of necessity? [Rosen]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 3. Combinatorial possibility
18855 Combinatorial theories of possibility assume the principles of combination don't change across worlds [Rosen]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
3013 Nothing is stronger than necessity, which rules everything [Thales, by Diog. Laertius]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
18853 A proposition is 'correctly' conceivable if an ominiscient being could conceive it [Rosen]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / c. Ultimate substances
1494 Thales said water is the first principle, perhaps from observing that food is moist [Thales, by Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
18854 The MRL view says laws are the theorems of the simplest and strongest account of the world [Rosen]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
1713 Thales must have thought soul causes movement, since he thought magnets have soul [Thales, by Aristotle]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
1742 Thales said the gods know our wrong thoughts as well as our evil actions [Thales, by Diog. Laertius]