Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Causal Structuralism' and 'Grounding Concepts'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


27 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Examining concepts can recover information obtained through the senses [Jenkins]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
Instead of correspondence of proposition to fact, look at correspondence of its parts [Jenkins]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Combining the concepts of negation and finiteness gives the concept of infinity [Jenkins]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Arithmetic concepts are indispensable because they accurately map the world [Jenkins]
Senses produce concepts that map the world, and arithmetic is known through these concepts [Jenkins]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
It is not easy to show that Hume's Principle is analytic or definitive in the required sense [Jenkins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
We can learn about the world by studying the grounding of our concepts [Jenkins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
There's essential, modal, explanatory, conceptual, metaphysical and constitutive dependence [Jenkins, by PG]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
The concepts we have to use for categorising are ones which map the real world well [Jenkins]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
A categorical basis could hardly explain a disposition if it had no powers of its own [Hawthorne]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Is the causal profile of a property its essence? [Hawthorne]
Could two different properties have the same causal profile? [Hawthorne]
If properties are more than their powers, we could have two properties with the same power [Hawthorne]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / b. Form as principle
We can treat the structure/form of the world differently from the nodes/matter of the world [Hawthorne]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
An individual essence is a necessary and sufficient profile for a thing [Hawthorne]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
Examining accurate, justified or grounded concepts brings understanding of the world [Jenkins]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
It is not enough that intuition be reliable - we need to know why it is reliable [Jenkins]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Knowledge is true belief which can be explained just by citing the proposition believed [Jenkins]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
Grounded concepts are trustworthy maps of the world [Jenkins]
The physical effect of world on brain explains the concepts we possess [Jenkins]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Verificationism is better if it says meaningfulness needs concepts grounded in the senses [Jenkins]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
Success semantics explains representation in terms of success in action [Jenkins]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
'Analytic' can be conceptual, or by meaning, or predicate inclusion, or definition... [Jenkins]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
Maybe scientific causation is just generalisation about the patterns [Hawthorne]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 6. Laws as Numerical
We only know the mathematical laws, but not much else [Hawthorne]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / d. Heresy
Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian]