19 ideas
2516 | Most of philosophy begins where science leaves off [Katz] |
2510 | Traditionally philosophy is an a priori enquiry into general truths about reality [Katz] |
10061 | The If-thenist view only seems to work for the axiomatised portions of mathematics [Musgrave] |
10065 | Perhaps If-thenism survives in mathematics if we stick to first-order logic [Musgrave] |
10049 | Logical truths may contain non-logical notions, as in 'all men are men' [Musgrave] |
10050 | A statement is logically true if it comes out true in all interpretations in all (non-empty) domains [Musgrave] |
10058 | No two numbers having the same successor relies on the Axiom of Infinity [Musgrave] |
2521 | 'Real' maths objects have no causal role, no determinate reference, and no abstract/concrete distinction [Katz] |
10062 | Formalism seems to exclude all creative, growing mathematics [Musgrave] |
10063 | Formalism is a bulwark of logical positivism [Musgrave] |
2513 | We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic [Katz] |
2522 | Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary [Katz] |
2517 | Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz] |
10060 | Logical positivists adopted an If-thenist version of logicism about numbers [Musgrave] |
2519 | It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference [Katz] |
2520 | Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz] |
2518 | Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens [Katz] |
16713 | Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian] |
6610 | I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian] |