79 ideas
21955 | My dogmatic slumber was first interrupted by David Hume [Kant] |
16931 | Metaphysics is generating a priori knowledge by intuition and concepts, leading to the synthetic [Kant] |
13634 | Satisfaction is 'truth in a model', which is a model of 'truth' [Shapiro] |
13643 | Aristotelian logic is complete [Shapiro] |
13651 | A set is 'transitive' if contains every member of each of its members [Shapiro] |
13647 | Choice is essential for proving downward Löwenheim-Skolem [Shapiro] |
13631 | Are sets part of logic, or part of mathematics? [Shapiro] |
13654 | It is central to the iterative conception that membership is well-founded, with no infinite descending chains [Shapiro] |
13640 | Russell's paradox shows that there are classes which are not iterative sets [Shapiro] |
13666 | Iterative sets are not Boolean; the complement of an iterative set is not an iterative sets [Shapiro] |
13653 | 'Well-ordering' of a set is an irreflexive, transitive, and binary relation with a least element [Shapiro] |
13627 | There is no 'correct' logic for natural languages [Shapiro] |
13642 | Logic is the ideal for learning new propositions on the basis of others [Shapiro] |
13668 | Bernays (1918) formulated and proved the completeness of propositional logic [Shapiro] |
13669 | Can one develop set theory first, then derive numbers, or are numbers more basic? [Shapiro] |
13667 | Skolem and Gödel championed first-order, and Zermelo, Hilbert, and Bernays championed higher-order [Shapiro] |
13662 | First-order logic was an afterthought in the development of modern logic [Shapiro] |
13624 | The 'triumph' of first-order logic may be related to logicism and the Hilbert programme, which failed [Shapiro] |
13660 | Maybe compactness, semantic effectiveness, and the Löwenheim-Skolem properties are desirable [Shapiro] |
13673 | The notion of finitude is actually built into first-order languages [Shapiro] |
15944 | Second-order logic is better than set theory, since it only adds relations and operations, and nothing else [Shapiro, by Lavine] |
13629 | Broad standard semantics, or Henkin semantics with a subclass, or many-sorted first-order semantics? [Shapiro] |
13650 | Henkin semantics has separate variables ranging over the relations and over the functions [Shapiro] |
13645 | In standard semantics for second-order logic, a single domain fixes the ranges for the variables [Shapiro] |
13649 | Completeness, Compactness and Löwenheim-Skolem fail in second-order standard semantics [Shapiro] |
13626 | Semantic consequence is ineffective in second-order logic [Shapiro] |
13637 | If a logic is incomplete, its semantic consequence relation is not effective [Shapiro] |
13632 | Finding the logical form of a sentence is difficult, and there are no criteria of correctness [Shapiro] |
13674 | We might reduce ontology by using truth of sentences and terms, instead of using objects satisfying models [Shapiro] |
13633 | 'Satisfaction' is a function from models, assignments, and formulas to {true,false} [Shapiro] |
13644 | Semantics for models uses set-theory [Shapiro] |
13636 | An axiomatization is 'categorical' if its models are isomorphic, so there is really only one interpretation [Shapiro] |
13670 | Categoricity can't be reached in a first-order language [Shapiro] |
13658 | Downward Löwenheim-Skolem: each satisfiable countable set always has countable models [Shapiro] |
13659 | Upward Löwenheim-Skolem: each infinite model has infinite models of all sizes [Shapiro] |
13648 | The Löwenheim-Skolem theorems show an explosion of infinite models, so 1st-order is useless for infinity [Shapiro] |
13675 | Substitutional semantics only has countably many terms, so Upward Löwenheim-Skolem trivially fails [Shapiro] |
13635 | 'Weakly sound' if every theorem is a logical truth; 'sound' if every deduction is a semantic consequence [Shapiro] |
13628 | We can live well without completeness in logic [Shapiro] |
13630 | Non-compactness is a strength of second-order logic, enabling characterisation of infinite structures [Shapiro] |
13646 | Compactness is derived from soundness and completeness [Shapiro] |
13661 | A language is 'semantically effective' if its logical truths are recursively enumerable [Shapiro] |
16918 | Mathematics cannot proceed just by the analysis of concepts [Kant] |
16919 | Geometry rests on our intuition of space [Kant] |
16930 | Geometry is not analytic, because a line's being 'straight' is a quality [Kant] |
16920 | Numbers are formed by addition of units in time [Kant] |
13641 | Complex numbers can be defined as reals, which are defined as rationals, then integers, then naturals [Shapiro] |
13676 | Only higher-order languages can specify that 0,1,2,... are all the natural numbers that there are [Shapiro] |
13677 | Natural numbers are the finite ordinals, and integers are equivalence classes of pairs of finite ordinals [Shapiro] |
16929 | 7+5 = 12 is not analytic, because no analysis of 7+5 will reveal the concept of 12 [Kant] |
13652 | The 'continuum' is the cardinality of the powerset of a denumerably infinite set [Shapiro] |
13657 | First-order arithmetic can't even represent basic number theory [Shapiro] |
13656 | Some sets of natural numbers are definable in set-theory but not in arithmetic [Shapiro] |
16910 | Mathematics can only start from an a priori intuition which is not empirical but pure [Kant] |
16917 | All necessary mathematical judgements are based on intuitions of space and time [Kant] |
16928 | Mathematics cannot be empirical because it is necessary, and that has to be a priori [Kant] |
13664 | Logicism is distinctive in seeking a universal language, and denying that logic is a series of abstractions [Shapiro] |
13625 | Mathematics and logic have no border, and logic must involve mathematics and its ontology [Shapiro] |
13663 | Some reject formal properties if they are not defined, or defined impredicatively [Shapiro] |
13638 | Properties are often seen as intensional; equiangular and equilateral are different, despite identity of objects [Shapiro] |
11833 | The substance, once the predicates are removed, remains unknown to us [Kant] |
21957 | 'Transcendental' concerns how we know, rather than what we know [Kant] |
16923 | I admit there are bodies outside us [Kant] |
21441 | 'Transcendental' is not beyond experience, but a prerequisite of experience [Kant] |
16916 | A priori synthetic knowledge is only of appearances, not of things in themselves [Kant] |
16915 | A priori intuitions can only concern the objects of our senses [Kant] |
16914 | A priori intuition of objects is only possible by containing the form of my sensibility [Kant] |
21447 | I can make no sense of the red experience being similar to the quality in the object [Kant] |
16924 | I count the primary features of things (as well as the secondary ones) as mere appearances [Kant] |
16913 | I can't intuit a present thing in itself, because the properties can't enter my representations [Kant] |
16925 | Appearance gives truth, as long as it is only used within experience [Kant] |
16911 | Intuition is a representation that depends on the presence of the object [Kant] |
16912 | Some concepts can be made a priori, which are general thoughts of objects, like quantity or cause [Kant] |
16926 | Analytic judgements say clearly what was in the concept of the subject [Kant] |
16927 | Analytic judgement rests on contradiction, since the predicate cannot be denied of the subject [Kant] |
16922 | Space must have three dimensions, because only three lines can meet at right angles [Kant] |
16921 | If all empirical sensation of bodies is removed, space and time are still left [Kant] |
16713 | Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian] |
6610 | I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian] |