Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Alfred Tarski: life and logic' and 'Matters of Mind'

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20 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
10147 The Axiom of Choice is consistent with the other axioms of set theory [Feferman/Feferman]
10148 Axiom of Choice: a set exists which chooses just one element each of any set of sets [Feferman/Feferman]
10149 Platonist will accept the Axiom of Choice, but others want criteria of selection or definition [Feferman/Feferman]
10150 The Trichotomy Principle is equivalent to the Axiom of Choice [Feferman/Feferman]
10146 Cantor's theories needed the Axiom of Choice, but it has led to great controversy [Feferman/Feferman]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
10158 A structure is a 'model' when the axioms are true. So which of the structures are models? [Feferman/Feferman]
10162 Tarski and Vaught established the equivalence relations between first-order structures [Feferman/Feferman]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
10160 Löwenheim-Skolem says if the sentences are countable, so is the model [Feferman/Feferman]
10159 Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem, and Gödel's completeness of first-order logic, the earliest model theory [Feferman/Feferman]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
10161 If a sentence holds in every model of a theory, then it is logically derivable from the theory [Feferman/Feferman]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 7. Decidability
10156 'Recursion theory' concerns what can be solved by computing machines [Feferman/Feferman]
10155 Both Principia Mathematica and Peano Arithmetic are undecidable [Feferman/Feferman]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
2534 Mindless bodies are zombies, bodiless minds are ghosts [Sturgeon]
2537 Types are properties, and tokens are events. Are they split between mental and physical, or not? [Sturgeon]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
2532 Intentionality isn't reducible, because of its experiential aspect [Sturgeon]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
2533 Rule-following can't be reduced to the physical [Sturgeon]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
2535 The main argument for physicalism is its simple account of causation [Sturgeon]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
2536 Do facts cause thoughts, or embody them, or what? [Sturgeon]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / d. Heresy
16713 Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
6610 I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian]