Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Appearance and Reality' and 'Treatise of Human Nature, Appendix'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


22 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Claims about 'the Absolute' are not even verifiable in principle [Ayer on Bradley]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
Metaphysics is finding bad reasons for instinctive beliefs [Bradley]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Names need a means of reidentifying their referents [Bradley, by Read]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
Internal relations are said to be intrinsic properties of two terms, and of the whole they compose [Bradley, by Russell]
Relations must be linked to their qualities, but that implies an infinite regress of relations [Bradley]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
Belief is a feeling, independent of the will, which arises from uncontrolled and unknown causes [Hume]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
British Idealists said reality is a single Mind which experiences itself [Bradley, by Grayling]
Bradley's objective idealism accepts reality (the Absolute), but says we can't fully describe it [Bradley, by Potter]
Qualities and relations are mere appearance; the Absolute is a single undifferentiated substance [Bradley, by Heil]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
A proposition cannot be intelligible or consistent, if the perceptions are not so [Hume]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
Hume needs a notion which includes degrees of resemblance [Shoemaker on Hume]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations
Experiences are logically separate, but factually linked by simultaneity or a feeling of continuousness [Ayer on Hume]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
Are self and substance the same? Then how can self remain if substance changes? [Hume]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
Perceptions are distinct, so no connection between them can ever be discovered [Hume]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
We have no impression of the self, and we therefore have no idea of it [Hume]
Does an oyster with one perception have a self? Would lots of perceptions change that? [Hume]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
We have no natural love of mankind, other than through various relationships [Hume]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
Reality is one, because plurality implies relations, and they assert a superior unity [Bradley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
Causation is just invariance, as long as it is described in general terms [Quine on Hume]
If impressions, memories and ideas only differ in vivacity, nothing says it is memory, or repetition [Whitehead on Hume]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / d. Heresy
Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian]