Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Action, Reasons and Causes' and 'Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature?'

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22 ideas

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it [Davidson, by Macdonald,C]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
Generalisations must be invariant to explain anything [Leuridan]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / h. Explanations by function
Biological functions are explained by disposition, or by causal role [Leuridan]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
Mechanisms must produce macro-level regularities, but that needs micro-level regularities [Leuridan]
Mechanisms can't explain on their own, as their models rest on pragmatic regularities [Leuridan]
We can show that regularities and pragmatic laws are more basic than mechanisms [Leuridan]
Mechanisms are ontologically dependent on regularities [Leuridan]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
There is nothing wrong with an infinite regress of mechanisms and regularities [Leuridan]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 2. Duration of an Action
If one action leads directly to another, they are all one action [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention [Davidson, by Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs
Acting for a reason is a combination of a pro attitude, and a belief that the action is appropriate [Davidson]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal [Davidson, by Smith,M]
Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them [Smith,M on Davidson]
Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons [Davidson, by Stout,R]
Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons [Davidson, by Lowe]
Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it [Davidson, by Kim]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
Rather than dispositions, functions may be the element that brought a thing into existence [Leuridan]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
Pragmatic laws allow prediction and explanation, to the extent that reality is stable [Leuridan]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
Strict regularities are rarely discovered in life sciences [Leuridan]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
A 'law of nature' is just a regularity, not some entity that causes the regularity [Leuridan]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / d. Heresy
Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian]