Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Action' and 'Substitutional Classes and Relations'

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23 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
21560 Any linguistic expression may lack meaning when taken out of context [Russell]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / a. Category mistakes
21561 'The number one is bald' or 'the number one is fond of cream cheese' are meaningless [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
18130 Axiom of Reducibility: there is always a function of the lowest possible order in a given level [Russell, by Bostock]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
21562 There is no complexity without relations, so no propositions, and no truth [Russell]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
1554 Contradiction is impossible, since only one side of the argument refers to the true facts [Prodicus, by Didymus the Blind]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
20014 Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
20019 Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall]
20021 Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20022 To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall]
20023 If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall]
20025 We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
20031 On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
20028 Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall]
20027 If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
20016 Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20017 Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20018 Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
20012 Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
20029 Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall]
20013 It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / c. Teleological Proof critique
1555 People used to think anything helpful to life was a god, as the Egyptians think the Nile a god [Prodicus]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
535 The gods are just personified human benefits [Prodicus]
1543 He denied the existence of the gods, saying they are just exaltations of things useful for life [Prodicus]