Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Ontological Dependence' and 'Two Kinds of Possibility'

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20 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / c. Philosophy as generalisation
14255 We understand things through their dependency relations [Fine,K]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
14250 Metaphysics deals with the existence of things and with the nature of things [Fine,K]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
14259 Maybe two objects might require simultaneous real definitions, as with two simultaneous terms [Fine,K]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / b. Being and existence
14253 An object's 'being' isn't existence; there's more to an object than existence, and its nature doesn't include existence [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
14254 Dependency is the real counterpart of one term defining another [Fine,K]
14261 There is 'weak' dependence in one definition, and 'strong' dependence in all the definitions [Fine,K]
14251 A natural modal account of dependence says x depends on y if y must exist when x does [Fine,K]
14257 An object depends on another if the second cannot be eliminated from the first's definition [Fine,K]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
14252 We should understand identity in terms of the propositions it renders true [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14256 How do we distinguish basic from derived esssences? [Fine,K]
14258 Maybe some things have essential relationships as well as essential properties [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
14260 An object only essentially has a property if that property follows from every definition of the object [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality
12205 There are two families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, of equal strength [Edgington]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
12207 Metaphysical possibility is discovered empirically, and is contrained by nature [Edgington]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
12206 Broadly logical necessity (i.e. not necessarily formal logical necessity) is an epistemic notion [Edgington]
12208 An argument is only valid if it is epistemically (a priori) necessary [Edgington]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
1554 Contradiction is impossible, since only one side of the argument refers to the true facts [Prodicus, by Didymus the Blind]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / c. Teleological Proof critique
1555 People used to think anything helpful to life was a god, as the Egyptians think the Nile a god [Prodicus]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
535 The gods are just personified human benefits [Prodicus]
1543 He denied the existence of the gods, saying they are just exaltations of things useful for life [Prodicus]