140 ideas
18330 | Judging by the positive forces, the Renaissance was the last great age [Nietzsche] |
2900 | I revere Heraclitus [Nietzsche] |
2913 | Thucydides was the perfect anti-platonist sophist [Nietzsche] |
2909 | Thinking has to be learned in the way dancing has to be learned [Nietzsche] |
5361 | Philosophers must get used to absurdities [Russell] |
5368 | Philosophy verifies that our hierarchy of instinctive beliefs is harmonious and consistent [Russell] |
5432 | Metaphysics cannot give knowledge of the universe as a whole [Russell] |
2892 | Wanting a system in philosophy is a lack of integrity [Nietzsche] |
5434 | Philosophy is similar to science, and has no special source of wisdom [Russell] |
2896 | I want to understand the Socratic idea that 'reason equals virtue equals happiness' [Nietzsche] |
5405 | The law of contradiction is not a 'law of thought', but a belief about things [Russell] |
5396 | Three Laws of Thought: identity, contradiction, and excluded middle [Russell] |
2897 | With dialectics the rabble gets on top [Nietzsche] |
2898 | Anything which must first be proved is of little value [Nietzsche] |
5420 | Truth is a property of a belief, but dependent on its external relations, not its internal qualities [Russell] |
5419 | Truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs and statements [Russell] |
5417 | A good theory of truth must make falsehood possible [Russell] |
7395 | Truth as congruence may work for complex beliefs, but not for simple beliefs about existence [Joslin on Russell] |
5428 | Beliefs are true if they have corresponding facts, and false if they don't [Russell] |
5421 | The coherence theory says falsehood is failure to cohere, and truth is fitting into a complete system of Truth [Russell] |
5422 | More than one coherent body of beliefs seems possible [Russell] |
5423 | If we suspend the law of contradiction, nothing will appear to be incoherent [Russell] |
5424 | Coherence is not the meaning of truth, but an important test for truth [Russell] |
5401 | The mortality of Socrates is more certain from induction than it is from deduction [Russell] |
5395 | Demonstration always relies on the rule that anything implied by a truth is true [Russell] |
5386 | Proper names are really descriptions, and can be replaced by a description in a person's mind [Russell] |
5385 | The phrase 'a so-and-so' is an 'ambiguous' description'; 'the so-and-so' (singular) is a 'definite' description [Russell] |
5399 | Maths is not known by induction, because further instances are not needed to support it [Russell] |
18317 | The 'real being' of things is a nothingness constructed from contradictions in the actual world [Nietzsche] |
18315 | We get the concept of 'being' from the concept of the 'ego' [Nietzsche] |
5370 | Space is neutral between touch and sight, so it cannot really be either of them [Russell] |
18316 | The grounds for an assertion that the world is only apparent actually establish its reality [Nietzsche] |
5418 | In a world of mere matter there might be 'facts', but no truths [Russell] |
5371 | Because we depend on correspondence, we know relations better than we know the items that relate [Russell] |
5407 | That Edinburgh is north of London is a non-mental fact, so relations are independent universals [Russell] |
5383 | Every complete sentence must contain at least one word (a verb) which stands for a universal [Russell] |
4428 | Propositions express relations (prepositions and verbs) as well as properties (nouns and adjectives) [Russell] |
5406 | Confused views of reality result from thinking that only nouns and adjectives represent universals [Russell] |
4479 | All universals are like the relation "is north of", in having no physical location at all [Russell, by Loux] |
4427 | Every sentence contains at least one word denoting a universal, so we need universals to know truth [Russell] |
4030 | Russell claims that universals are needed to explain a priori knowledge (as their relations) [Russell, by Mellor/Oliver] |
5409 | Normal existence is in time, so we must say that universals 'subsist' [Russell] |
5408 | If we identify whiteness with a thought, we can never think of it twice; whiteness is the object of a thought [Russell] |
4441 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' won't work, because the theory treats resemblance itself as a universal [Russell] |
4429 | If we consider whiteness to be merely a mental 'idea', we rob it of its universality [Russell] |
18314 | In language we treat 'ego' as a substance, and it is thus that we create the concept 'thing' [Nietzsche] |
5400 | In any possible world we feel that two and two would be four [Russell] |
5431 | Knowledge cannot be precisely defined, as it merges into 'probable opinion' [Russell] |
5426 | Belief relates a mind to several things other than itself [Russell] |
5366 | We have an 'instinctive' belief in the external world, prior to all reflection [Russell] |
5359 | Descartes showed that subjective things are the most certain [Russell] |
5377 | 'Acquaintance' is direct awareness, without inferences or judgements [Russell] |
6510 | Russell (1912) said phenomena only resemble reality in abstract structure [Russell, by Robinson,H] |
5372 | There is no reason to think that objects have colours [Russell] |
5373 | 'Idealism' says that everything which exists is in some sense mental [Russell] |
5362 | It is not illogical to think that only myself and my mental events exist [Russell] |
5412 | Some propositions are self-evident, but their implications may also be self-evident [Russell] |
5413 | Particular instances are more clearly self-evident than any general principles [Russell] |
5415 | As shown by memory, self-evidence comes in degrees [Russell] |
5416 | If self-evidence has degrees, we should accept the more self-evident as correct [Russell] |
5397 | The rationalists were right, because we know logical principles without experience [Russell] |
4430 | All a priori knowledge deals with the relations of universals [Russell] |
5411 | We can know some general propositions by universals, when no instance can be given [Russell] |
6514 | Russell's representationalism says primary qualities only show the structure of reality [Russell, by Robinson,H] |
6415 | After 1912, Russell said sense-data are last in analysis, not first in experience [Russell, by Grayling] |
5358 | 'Sense-data' are what are immediately known in sensation, such as colours or roughnesses [Russell] |
18309 | The evidence of the senses is falsified by reason [Nietzsche] |
7290 | If Russell rejects innate ideas and direct a priori knowledge, he is left with a tabula rasa [Russell, by Thompson] |
5357 | It is natural to begin from experience, and presumably that is the basis of knowledge [Russell] |
5382 | We are acquainted with outer and inner sensation, memory, Self, and universals [Russell, by PG] |
5389 | Knowledge by descriptions enables us to transcend private experience [Russell] |
5376 | I can know the existence of something with which nobody is acquainted [Russell] |
5414 | Images are not memory, because they are present, and memories are of the past [Russell] |
5430 | A true belief is not knowledge if it is reached by bad reasoning [Russell] |
5429 | True belief is not knowledge when it is deduced from false belief [Russell] |
5378 | All knowledge (of things and of truths) rests on the foundations of acquaintance [Russell] |
5365 | Dreams can be explained fairly scientifically if we assume a physical world [Russell] |
5391 | Science aims to find uniformities to which (within the limits of experience) there are no exceptions [Russell] |
5394 | We can't prove induction from experience without begging the question [Russell] |
5390 | Chickens are not very good at induction, and are surprised when their feeder wrings their neck [Russell] |
5392 | It doesn't follow that because the future has always resembled the past, that it always will [Russell] |
5363 | If the cat reappears in a new position, presumably it has passed through the intermediate positions [Russell] |
5367 | Belief in real objects makes our account of experience simpler and more systematic [Russell] |
18323 | Any explanation will be accepted as true if it gives pleasure and a feeling of power [Nietzsche] |
5364 | It is hard not to believe that speaking humans are expressing thoughts, just as we do ourselves [Russell] |
5379 | If we didn't know our own minds by introspection, we couldn't know that other people have minds [Russell] |
18310 | The 'highest' concepts are the most general and empty concepts [Nietzsche] |
5410 | I learn the universal 'resemblance' by seeing two shades of green, and their contrast with red [Russell] |
5381 | In seeing the sun, we are acquainted with our self, but not as a permanent person [Russell] |
5380 | In perceiving the sun, I am aware of sun sense-data, and of the perceiver of the data [Russell] |
20368 | There are no 'individual' persons; we are each the sum of humanity up to this moment [Nietzsche] |
5369 | It is rational to believe in reality, despite the lack of demonstrative reasons for it [Russell] |
2899 | The fanatical rationality of Greek philosophy shows that they were in a state of emergency [Nietzsche] |
5375 | Knowledge of truths applies to judgements; knowledge by acquaintance applies to sensations and things [Russell] |
21711 | Russell's 'multiple relations' theory says beliefs attach to ingredients, not to propositions [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
5427 | Truth is when a mental state corresponds to a complex unity of external constituents [Russell] |
5425 | In order to explain falsehood, a belief must involve several terms, not two [Russell] |
5384 | A universal of which we are aware is called a 'concept' [Russell] |
13468 | Russell started philosophy of language, by declaring some plausible sentences to be meaningless [Russell, by Hart,WD] |
5388 | Every understood proposition is composed of constituents with which we are acquainted [Russell] |
5387 | It is pure chance which descriptions in a person's mind make a name apply to an individual [Russell] |
21724 | The main aim of the multiple relations theory of judgement was to dispense with propositions [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
1554 | Contradiction is impossible, since only one side of the argument refers to the true facts [Prodicus, by Didymus the Blind] |
18313 | The big error is to think the will is a faculty producing effects; in fact, it is just a word [Nietzsche] |
20133 | The 'motive' is superficial, and may even hide the antecedents of a deed [Nietzsche] |
18326 | The beautiful never stands alone; it derives from man's pleasure in man [Nietzsche] |
20101 | Without music life would be a mistake [Nietzsche] |
2902 | Healthy morality is dominated by an instinct for life [Nietzsche] |
18311 | Philosophers hate values having an origin, and want values to be self-sufficient [Nietzsche] |
18324 | There are no moral facts, and moralists believe in realities which do not exist [Nietzsche] |
2904 | The doctrine of free will has been invented essentially in order to blame and punish people [Nietzsche] |
2894 | Value judgements about life can never be true [Nietzsche] |
18321 | To evaluate life one must know it, but also be situated outside of it [Nietzsche] |
2895 | The value of life cannot be estimated [Nietzsche] |
18322 | When we establish values, that is life itself establishing them, through us [Nietzsche] |
2893 | In every age the wisest people have judged life to be worthless [Nietzsche] |
18308 | A philosopher fails in wisdom if he thinks the value of life is a problem [Nietzsche] |
18319 | Love is the spiritualisation of sensuality [Nietzsche] |
2903 | A good human will be virtuous because they are happy [Nietzsche] |
2891 | Only the English actually strive after happiness [Nietzsche] |
18327 | A wholly altruistic morality, with no egoism, is a thoroughly bad thing [Nietzsche] |
15606 | Military idea: what does not kill me makes me stronger [Nietzsche] |
18328 | Invalids are parasites [Nietzsche] |
5398 | Judgements of usefulness depend on judgements of value [Russell] |
18331 | Democracy is organisational power in decline [Nietzsche] |
18332 | The creation of institutions needs a determination which is necessarily anti-liberal [Nietzsche] |
2911 | True justice is equality for equals and inequality for unequals [Nietzsche] |
18320 | To renounce war is to renounce the grand life [Nietzsche] |
2908 | There is a need for educators who are themselves educated [Nietzsche] |
18329 | Sometimes it is an error to have been born - but we can rectify it [Nietzsche] |
2905 | 'Purpose' is just a human fiction [Nietzsche] |
5393 | We can't know that our laws are exceptionless, or even that there are any laws [Russell] |
18312 | The supreme general but empty concepts must be compatible, and hence we get 'God' [Nietzsche] |
1555 | People used to think anything helpful to life was a god, as the Egyptians think the Nile a god [Prodicus] |
2906 | By denying God we deny human accountability, and thus we redeem the world [Nietzsche] |
535 | The gods are just personified human benefits [Prodicus] |
1543 | He denied the existence of the gods, saying they are just exaltations of things useful for life [Prodicus] |
2901 | How could the Church intelligently fight against passion if it preferred poorness of spirit to intelligence? [Nietzsche] |
18325 | Christians believe that only God can know what is good for man [Nietzsche] |
18318 | People who disparage actual life avenge themselves by imagining a better one [Nietzsche] |