18 ideas
19125 | If we define truth, we can eliminate it [Halbach/Leigh] |
19128 | If a language cannot name all objects, then satisfaction must be used, instead of unary truth [Halbach/Leigh] |
19120 | Semantic theories need a powerful metalanguage, typically including set theory [Halbach/Leigh] |
19127 | The T-sentences are deductively weak, and also not deductively conservative [Halbach/Leigh] |
19124 | A natural theory of truth plays the role of reflection principles, establishing arithmetic's soundness [Halbach/Leigh] |
19126 | If deflationary truth is not explanatory, truth axioms should be 'conservative', proving nothing new [Halbach/Leigh] |
19129 | The FS axioms use classical logical, but are not fully consistent [Halbach/Leigh] |
19130 | KF is formulated in classical logic, but describes non-classical truth, which allows truth-value gluts [Halbach/Leigh] |
19121 | We can reduce properties to true formulas [Halbach/Leigh] |
19122 | Nominalists can reduce theories of properties or sets to harmless axiomatic truth theories [Halbach/Leigh] |
14221 | Serious essentialism says everything has essences, they're not things, and they ground necessities [Shalkowski] |
14222 | Essences are what it is to be that (kind of) thing - in fact, they are the thing's identity [Shalkowski] |
14226 | We distinguish objects by their attributes, not by their essences [Shalkowski] |
14225 | Critics say that essences are too mysterious to be known [Shalkowski] |
14223 | De dicto necessity has linguistic entities as their source, so it is a type of de re necessity [Shalkowski] |
14224 | Equilateral and equiangular aren't the same, as we have to prove their connection [Shalkowski] |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |