16 ideas
17325 | Truth-maker theory can't cope with non-causal dependence [Liggins] |
17318 | Truthmakers for existence is fine; otherwise maybe restrict it to synthetic truths? [Liggins] |
17320 | Either p is true or not-p is true, so something is true, so something exists [Liggins] |
17326 | The dependence of {Socrates} on Socrates involves a set and a philosopher, not facts [Liggins] |
17327 | Non-causal dependence is at present only dimly understood [Liggins] |
17322 | Necessities supervene on everything, but don't depend on everything [Liggins] |
14347 | A 'finkish' disposition is one that is lost immediately after the appropriate stimulus [Corry] |
14348 | An 'antidote' allows a manifestation to begin, but then blocks it [Corry] |
14350 | If a disposition is never instantiated, it shouldn't be part of our theory of nature [Corry] |
14351 | Maybe an experiment unmasks an essential disposition, and reveals its regularities [Corry] |
17324 | 'Because' can signal an inference rather than an explanation [Liggins] |
17321 | Value, constitution and realisation are non-causal dependences that explain [Liggins] |
17323 | If explanations track dependence, then 'determinative' explanations seem to exist [Liggins] |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
14346 | Dispositional essentialism says fundamental laws of nature are strict, not ceteris paribus [Corry] |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |