33 ideas
3695 | Philosophy is a priori if it is anything [Bonjour] |
4739 | In "if and only if" (iff), "if" expresses the sufficient condition, and "only if" the necessary condition [Engel] |
3651 | Perceiving necessary connections is the essence of reasoning [Bonjour] |
3700 | Coherence can't be validated by appeal to coherence [Bonjour] |
4737 | Are truth-bearers propositions, or ideas/beliefs, or sentences/utterances? [Engel] |
4750 | The redundancy theory gets rid of facts, for 'it is a fact that p' just means 'p' [Engel] |
4744 | We can't explain the corresponding structure of the world except by referring to our thoughts [Engel] |
4738 | The coherence theory says truth is an internal relationship between groups of truth-bearers [Engel] |
4745 | Any coherent set of beliefs can be made more coherent by adding some false beliefs [Engel] |
4753 | Deflationism seems to block philosophers' main occupation, asking metatheoretical questions [Engel] |
4755 | Deflationism cannot explain why we hold beliefs for reasons [Engel] |
4751 | Maybe there is no more to be said about 'true' than there is about the function of 'and' in logic [Engel] |
4752 | Deflationism must reduce bivalence ('p is true or false') to excluded middle ('p or not-p') [Engel] |
3697 | The concept of possibility is prior to that of necessity [Bonjour] |
4762 | The Humean theory of motivation is that beliefs may be motivators as well as desires [Engel] |
4754 | Our beliefs are meant to fit the world (i.e. be true), where we want the world to fit our desires [Engel] |
4763 | 'Evidentialists' say, and 'voluntarists' deny, that we only believe on the basis of evidence [Engel] |
3704 | Moderate rationalists believe in fallible a priori justification [Bonjour] |
3707 | Our rules of thought can only be judged by pure rational insight [Bonjour] |
4746 | Pragmatism is better understood as a theory of belief than as a theory of truth [Engel] |
3706 | A priori justification can vary in degree [Bonjour] |
3696 | A priori justification requires understanding but no experience [Bonjour] |
3703 | You can't explain away a priori justification as analyticity, and you can't totally give it up [Bonjour] |
3699 | The induction problem blocks any attempted proof of physical statements [Bonjour] |
3701 | Externalist theories of justification don't require believers to have reasons for their beliefs [Bonjour] |
4764 | We cannot directly control our beliefs, but we can control the causes of our involuntary beliefs [Engel] |
3702 | Externalism means we have no reason to believe, which is strong scepticism [Bonjour] |
3709 | Induction must go beyond the evidence, in order to explain why the evidence occurred [Bonjour] |
4759 | Mental states as functions are second-order properties, realised by first-order physical properties [Engel] |
3708 | All thought represents either properties or indexicals [Bonjour] |
3698 | Indeterminacy of translation is actually indeterminacy of meaning and belief [Bonjour] |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |