40 ideas
| 5333 | Philosophy needs wisdom about who we are, as well as how we ought to be [Flanagan] |
| 3695 | Philosophy is a priori if it is anything [Bonjour] |
| 5334 | We resist science partly because it can't provide ethical wisdom [Flanagan] |
| 3651 | Perceiving necessary connections is the essence of reasoning [Bonjour] |
| 3700 | Coherence can't be validated by appeal to coherence [Bonjour] |
| 3697 | The concept of possibility is prior to that of necessity [Bonjour] |
| 3704 | Moderate rationalists believe in fallible a priori justification [Bonjour] |
| 3707 | Our rules of thought can only be judged by pure rational insight [Bonjour] |
| 3706 | A priori justification can vary in degree [Bonjour] |
| 3696 | A priori justification requires understanding but no experience [Bonjour] |
| 3703 | You can't explain away a priori justification as analyticity, and you can't totally give it up [Bonjour] |
| 3699 | The induction problem blocks any attempted proof of physical statements [Bonjour] |
| 3701 | Externalist theories of justification don't require believers to have reasons for their beliefs [Bonjour] |
| 3702 | Externalism means we have no reason to believe, which is strong scepticism [Bonjour] |
| 5340 | Explanation does not entail prediction [Flanagan] |
| 3709 | Induction must go beyond the evidence, in order to explain why the evidence occurred [Bonjour] |
| 5346 | In the 17th century a collisionlike view of causation made mental causation implausible [Flanagan] |
| 5341 | Only you can have your subjective experiences because only you are hooked up to your nervous system [Flanagan] |
| 5351 | We only have a sense of our self as continuous, not as exactly the same [Flanagan] |
| 5353 | The self is an abstraction which magnifies important aspects of autobiography [Flanagan] |
| 5354 | We are not born with a self; we develop a self through living [Flanagan] |
| 5349 | For Buddhists a fixed self is a morally dangerous illusion [Flanagan] |
| 5338 | Normal free will claims control of what I do, but a stronger view claims control of thought and feeling [Flanagan] |
| 5344 | Free will is held to give us a whole list of desirable capacities for living [Flanagan] |
| 5332 | People believe they have free will that circumvents natural law, but only an incorporeal mind could do this [Flanagan] |
| 5345 | We only think of ourselves as having free will because we first thought of God that way [Flanagan] |
| 5343 | People largely came to believe in dualism because it made human agents free [Flanagan] |
| 5347 | Behaviourism notoriously has nothing to say about mental causation [Flanagan] |
| 5339 | Cars and bodies obey principles of causation, without us knowing any 'strict laws' about them [Flanagan] |
| 5342 | Physicalism doesn't deny that the essence of an experience is more than its neural realiser [Flanagan] |
| 5335 | Emotions are usually very apt, rather than being non-rational and fickle [Flanagan] |
| 3708 | All thought represents either properties or indexicals [Bonjour] |
| 3698 | Indeterminacy of translation is actually indeterminacy of meaning and belief [Bonjour] |
| 5348 | Intellectualism admires the 'principled actor', non-intellectualism admires the 'good character' [Flanagan] |
| 5355 | Cognitivists think morals are discovered by reason [Flanagan] |
| 5336 | Ethics is the science of the conditions that lead to human flourishing [Flanagan] |
| 13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
| 20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
| 5350 | The Hindu doctrine of reincarnation only appeared in the eighth century CE [Flanagan] |
| 5352 | The idea of the soul gets some support from the scientific belief in essential 'natural kinds' [Flanagan] |