Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Structure of Objects' and 'My Philosophical Development'

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47 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Only by analysing is progress possible in philosophy [Russell]
Analysis gives new knowledge, without destroying what we already have [Russell]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / a. Category mistakes
The theory of types makes 'Socrates and killing are two' illegitimate [Russell]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Truth belongs to beliefs, not to propositions and sentences [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
I gradually replaced classes with properties, and they ended as a symbolic convenience [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
The 'aggregative' objections says mereology gets existence and location of objects wrong [Koslicki]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Consequence is truth-preserving, either despite substitutions, or in all interpretations [Koslicki]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
'Roses are red; therefore, roses are colored' seems truth-preserving, but not valid in a system [Koslicki]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Leibniz bases everything on subject/predicate and substance/property propositions [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate [Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
Some questions concern mathematical entities, rather than whole structures [Koslicki]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
We tried to define all of pure maths using logical premisses and concepts [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
Formalists say maths is merely conventional marks on paper, like the arbitrary rules of chess [Russell]
Formalism can't apply numbers to reality, so it is an evasion [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
Intuitionism says propositions are only true or false if there is a method of showing it [Russell]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
In 1899-1900 I adopted the philosophy of logical atomism [Russell]
Complex things can be known, but not simple things [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
Facts are everything, except simples; they are either relations or qualities [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 3. Structural Relations
Structures have positions, constituent types and number, and some invariable parts [Koslicki]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
'Categorical' properties exist in the actual world, and 'hypothetical' properties in other worlds [Koslicki]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
Universals can't just be words, because words themselves are universals [Russell]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
I aim to put the notion of structure or form back into the concepts of part, whole and object [Koslicki]
If a whole is just a structure, a dinner party wouldn't need the guests to turn up [Koslicki]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
The clay is just a part of the statue (its matter); the rest consists of its form or structure [Koslicki]
Statue and clay differ in modal and temporal properties, and in constitution [Koslicki]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / c. Form as causal
Structure or form are right at the centre of modern rigorous modes of enquiry [Koslicki]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
There are at least six versions of constitution being identity [Koslicki]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
For three-dimensionalist parthood must be a three-place relation, including times [Koslicki]
The parts may be the same type as the whole, like a building made of buildings [Koslicki]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Wholes in modern mereology are intended to replace sets, so they closely resemble them [Koslicki]
Wholes are entities distinct from their parts, and have different properties [Koslicki]
Wholes are not just their parts; a whole is an entity distinct from the proper parts [Koslicki]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
In epistemology we should emphasis the continuity between animal and human minds [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 3. Pragmatism
Pragmatism judges by effects, but I judge truth by causes [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Empiricists seem unclear what they mean by 'experience' [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
True belief about the time is not knowledge if I luckily observe a stopped clock at the right moment [Russell]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Behaviourists struggle to explain memory and imagination, because they won't admit images [Russell]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
Surprise is a criterion of error [Russell]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Unverifiable propositions about the remote past are still either true or false [Russell]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
You can believe the meaning of a sentence without thinking of the words [Russell]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
The Kripke/Putnam approach to natural kind terms seems to give them excessive stability [Koslicki]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
Natural kinds support inductive inferences, from previous samples to the next one [Koslicki]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
Concepts for species are either intrinsic structure, or relations like breeding or ancestry [Koslicki]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
Should vernacular classifications ever be counted as natural kind terms? [Koslicki]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
There are apparently no scientific laws concerning biological species [Koslicki]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus]