Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Human Condition' and 'Scientific Essentialism'

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64 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Ontology should give insight into or an explanation of the world revealed by science [Ellis]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
Real possibility and necessity has the logic of S5, which links equivalence classes of worlds of the same kind [Ellis]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 5. Extensionalism
Humean conceptions of reality drive the adoption of extensional logic [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
The extension of a property is a contingent fact, so cannot be the essence of the property [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
There is no property of 'fragility', as things are each fragile in a distinctive way [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Typical 'categorical' properties are spatio-temporal, such as shape [Ellis]
The property of 'being an electron' is not of anything, and only electrons could have it [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
'Being a methane molecule' is not a property - it is just a predicate [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Causal powers must necessarily act the way they do [Ellis]
Causal powers are often directional (e.g. centripetal, centrifugal, circulatory) [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
Basic powers may not be explained by structure, if at the bottom level there is no structure [Ellis]
Maybe dispositions can be explained by intrinsic properties or structures [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
The most fundamental properties of nature (mass, charge, spin ...) all seem to be dispositions [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
A causal power is a disposition to produce forces [Ellis]
Powers are dispositions of the essences of kinds that involve them in causation [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
There are 'substantive' (objects of some kind), 'dynamic' (events of some kind) and 'property' universals [Ellis]
Universals are all types of natural kind [Ellis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Scientific essentialism doesn't really need Kripkean individual essences [Ellis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
The old idea that identity depends on essence and behaviour is rejected by the empiricists [Ellis]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Necessities are distinguished by their grounds, not their different modalities [Ellis]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
'Luck' is the unpredictable and inexplicable intersection of causal chains [Kekes]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
Individual essences necessitate that individual; natural kind essences necessitate kind membership [Ellis]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
If events are unconnected, then induction cannot be solved [Ellis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
Good explanations unify [Ellis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
Explanations of particular events are not essentialist, as they don't reveal essential structures [Ellis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
To give essentialist explanations there have to be natural kinds [Ellis]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
The point of models in theories is not to idealise, but to focus on what is essential [Ellis]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
An action may be intended under one description, but not under another [Kekes]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs
To control our actions better, make them result from our attitudes, not from circumstances [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
Values are an attempt to achieve well-being by bringing contingencies under control [Kekes]
Values help us to control life, by connecting it to what is stable and manageable [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Responsibility is unprovoked foreseeable harm, against society, arising from vicious character [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Reason and morality do not coincide; immorality can be reasonable, with an ideology [Kekes]
Practical reason is not universal and impersonal, because it depends on what success is [Kekes]
If morality has to be rational, then moral conflicts need us to be irrational and immoral [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Relativists say all values are relative; pluralists concede much of that, but not 'human' values [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
We are bound to regret some values we never aspired to [Kekes]
There are far more values than we can pursue, so they are optional possibilities [Kekes]
Innumerable values arise for us, from our humanity, our culture, and our individuality [Kekes]
Cultural values are interpretations of humanity, conduct, institutions, and evaluations [Kekes]
The big value problems are evil (humanity), disenchantment (cultures), and boredom (individuals) [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Our attitudes include what possibilities we value, and also what is allowable, and unthinkable [Kekes]
Unconditional commitments are our most basic convictions, saying what must never be done [Kekes]
Doing the unthinkable damages ourselves, so it is more basic than any value [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
Evil isn't explained by nature, by monsters, by uncharacteristic actions, or by society [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Control is the key to well-being [Kekes]
Well-being needs correct attitudes and well-ordered commitments to local values [Kekes]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Boredom destroys our ability to evaluate [Kekes]
Boredom is apathy and restlessness, yearning for something interesting [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
Society is alienating if it lacks our values, and its values repel us [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
The ideal of an ideology is embodied in a text, a role model, a law of history, a dream of the past... [Kekes]
Ideologies have beliefs about reality, ideals, a gap with actuality, and a program [Kekes]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Equal distribution is no good in a shortage, because there might be no one satisfied [Kekes]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
There might be uninstantiated natural kinds, such as transuranic elements which have never occurred [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
Natural kinds are distinguished by resting on essences [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
If there are borderline cases between natural kinds, that makes them superficial [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
Laws don't exist in the world; they are true of the world [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
A proton must have its causal role, because without it it wouldn't be a proton [Ellis]
What is most distinctive of scientific essentialism is regarding processes as natural kinds [Ellis]
Scientific essentialism is more concerned with explanation than with identity (Locke, not Kripke) [Ellis]
The ontological fundamentals are dispositions, and also categorical (spatio-temporal and structural) properties [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
A primary aim of science is to show the limits of the possible [Ellis]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus]