57 ideas
21422 | Moral self-knowledge is the beginning of all human wisdom [Kant] |
21408 | For any subject, its system of non-experiential concepts needs a metaphysics [Kant] |
21416 | Philosophers should not offer multiple proofs - suggesting the weakness of each of them [Kant] |
6504 | For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal [Robinson,H] |
6520 | If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features? [Robinson,H] |
21410 | That a concept is not self-contradictory does not make what it represents possible [Kant] |
6485 | When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red [Robinson,H] |
6521 | Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world [Robinson,H] |
6509 | Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves [Robinson,H] |
6522 | Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century) [Robinson,H] |
6502 | Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition? [Robinson,H] |
6513 | Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking? [Robinson,H] |
6512 | Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more [Robinson,H] |
6497 | We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them [Robinson,H] |
6494 | If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured [Robinson,H] |
6499 | Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way [Robinson,H] |
6500 | If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities? [Robinson,H] |
6484 | Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception [Robinson,H] |
6508 | Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism [Robinson,H] |
6480 | Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality [Robinson,H] |
6482 | For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects [Robinson,H] |
6505 | Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism [Robinson,H] |
6506 | 'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse [Robinson,H] |
6507 | Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects [Robinson,H] |
6511 | If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy. [Robinson,H] |
6515 | An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained [Robinson,H] |
6517 | If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it? [Robinson,H] |
6481 | If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties? [Robinson,H] |
21421 | Within nature man is unimportant, but as moral person he is above any price [Kant] |
6503 | Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything [Robinson,H] |
21415 | Duty is impossible without prior moral feeling, conscience, love and self-respect [Kant] |
21409 | Moral principles do not involve feelings [Kant] |
21431 | The love of man is required in order to present the world as a beautiful and perfect moral whole [Kant] |
21437 | All morality directs the will to love of others' ends, and respect for others' rights [Kant] |
21429 | The duty of love is to makes the ends of others one's own [Kant] |
21411 | A duty of virtue is a duty which is also an end [Kant] |
21413 | Virtue is strong maxims for duty [Kant] |
21414 | The supreme principle of virtue is to find universal laws for ends [Kant] |
21436 | We are obliged to show the social virtues, but at least they make a virtuous disposition fashionable [Kant] |
21419 | If virtue becomes a habit, that is a loss of the freedom needed for adopting maxims [Kant] |
21417 | How do we distinguish a mean? The extremes can involve quite different maxims [Kant] |
21420 | If virtue is the mean between vices, then virtue is just the vanishing of vice [Kant] |
21418 | There is one principle of virtues; the virtues are distinguished by their objects [Kant] |
21425 | We can love without respect, and show respect without love [Kant] |
21430 | Disrespect is using a person as a mere means to my own ends [Kant] |
21427 | Respect is limiting our self-esteem by attending to the human dignity of other persons [Kant] |
21426 | Love urges us to get closer to people, but respect to keep our distance [Kant] |
21428 | Respect is purely negative (of not exalting oneself over others), and is thus a duty of Right [Kant] |
21434 | We must respect the humanity even in a vicious criminal [Kant] |
21412 | Humans are distinguished from animals by their capacity to set themselves any sort of end [Kant] |
21435 | Man is both social, and unsociable [Kant] |
21433 | Violation of rights deserves punishment, which is vengeance, rather than restitution [Kant] |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
21423 | Men can only have duties to those who qualify as persons [Kant] |
21424 | Cruelty to animals is bad because it dulls our empathy for pain in humans [Kant] |
6519 | Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined [Robinson,H] |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |