Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'On Sense and Reference' and 'Enquiry Conc Human Understanding'

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120 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
The observation of human blindness and weakness is the result of all philosophy [Hume]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
If we suspect that a philosophical term is meaningless, we should ask what impression it derives from [Hume]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
All experimental conclusions assume that the future will be like the past [Hume]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 3. Analogy
All reasoning concerning matters of fact is based on analogy (with similar results of similar causes) [Hume]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Frege was strongly in favour of taking truth to attach to propositions [Frege, by Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
We can treat designation by a few words as a proper name [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Proper name in modal contexts refer obliquely, to their usual sense [Frege, by Gibbard]
A Fregean proper name has a sense determining an object, instead of a concept [Frege, by Sainsbury]
People may have different senses for 'Aristotle', like 'pupil of Plato' or 'teacher of Alexander' [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
The meaning of a proper name is the designated object [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
Frege ascribes reference to incomplete expressions, as well as to singular terms [Frege, by Hale]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
If sentences have a 'sense', empty name sentences can be understood that way [Frege, by Sawyer]
It is a weakness of natural languages to contain non-denoting names [Frege]
In a logically perfect language every well-formed proper name designates an object [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 6. Intensionalism
Frege is intensionalist about reference, as it is determined by sense; identity of objects comes first [Frege, by Jacquette]
Frege moved from extensional to intensional semantics when he added the idea of 'sense' [Frege, by Sawyer]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Reason assists experience in discovering laws, and in measuring their application [Hume]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
We can't think about the abstract idea of triangles, but only of particular triangles [Hume]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
We cannot form an idea of a 'power', and the word is without meaning [Hume]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
We can't get a semantics from nouns and predicates referring to the same thing [Frege, by Dummett]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Frege was asking how identities could be informative [Frege, by Perry]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
We transfer the frequency of past observations to our future predictions [Hume]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
There is no such thing as chance [Hume]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
Belief is stronger, clearer and steadier than imagination [Hume]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
Belief can't be a concept plus an idea, or we could add the idea to fictions [Hume]
Belief is just a particular feeling attached to ideas of objects [Hume]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
Beliefs are built up by resemblance, contiguity and causation [Hume]
'Natural beliefs' are unavoidable, whatever our judgements [Hume, by Strawson,G]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
Relations of ideas are known by thought, independently from the world [Hume]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
If secondary qualities (e.g. hardness) are in the mind, so are primary qualities like extension [Hume]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
It never occurs to people that they only experience representations, not the real objects [Hume]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
All reasoning about facts is causal; nothing else goes beyond memory and senses [Hume]
All ideas are copies of impressions [Hume]
Hume is loose when he says perceptions of different strength are different species [Reid on Hume]
Impressions are our livelier perceptions, Ideas the less lively ones [Hume]
All objects of enquiry are Relations of Ideas, or Matters of Fact [Hume]
If books don't relate ideas or explain facts, commit them to the flames [Hume]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
All ideas are connected by Resemblance, Contiguity in time or place, and Cause and Effect [Hume]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
We cannot form the idea of something we haven't experienced [Hume]
Only madmen dispute the authority of experience [Hume]
When definitions are pushed to the limit, only experience can make them precise [Hume]
How could Adam predict he would drown in water or burn in fire? [Hume]
We can only invent a golden mountain by combining experiences [Hume]
You couldn't reason at all if you lacked experience [Hume]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
If a person had a gap in their experience of blue shades, they could imaginatively fill it in [Hume]
Hume mistakenly lumps sensations and perceptions together as 'impressions' [Scruton on Hume]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
Reasons for belief must eventually terminate in experience, or they are without foundation [Hume]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
There is no certain supreme principle, or infallible rule of inference [Hume]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
We think testimony matches reality because of experience, not some a priori connection [Hume]
Good testimony needs education, integrity, motive and agreement [Hume, by PG]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Reason can never show that experiences are connected to external objects [Hume]
Mitigated scepticism draws attention to the limitations of human reason, and encourages modesty [Hume]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
Mitigated scepticism sensibly confines our enquiries to the narrow capacity of human understanding [Hume]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
Examples of illusion only show that sense experience needs correction by reason [Hume]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
It is a very extravagant aim of the sceptics to destroy reason and argument by means of reason and argument [Hume]
The main objection to scepticism is that no good can come of it [Hume]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
We assume similar secret powers behind similar experiences, such as the nourishment of bread [Hume]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
Induction can't prove that the future will be like the past, since induction assumes this [Hume]
If we infer causes from repetition, this explains why we infer from a thousand objects what we couldn't infer from one [Hume]
All inferences from experience are effects of custom, not reasoning [Hume]
Reason cannot show why reliable past experience should extend to future times and remote places [Hume]
Fools, children and animals all learn from experience [Hume]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
Premises can support an argument without entailing it [Pollock/Cruz on Hume]
Hume just shows induction isn't deduction [Williams,M on Hume]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
A picture of a friend strengthens our idea of him, by resemblance [Hume]
General ideas are the connection by resemblance to some particular [Hume]
Hume does not distinguish real resemblances among degrees of resemblance [Shoemaker on Hume]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 8. Remembering Contiguity
When I am close to (contiguous with) home, I feel its presence more nearly [Hume]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 9. Perceiving Causation
An object made by a saint is the best way to produce thoughts of him [Hume]
Our awareness of patterns of causation is too important to be left to slow and uncertain reasoning [Hume]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
The doctrine of free will arises from a false sensation we have of freedom in many actions [Hume]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
Liberty is merely acting according to the will, which anyone can do if they are not in chains [Hume]
Hume makes determinism less rigid by removing the necessity from causation [Trusted on Hume]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
'The concept "horse"' denotes a concept, yet seems also to denote an object [Frege, by McGee]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
Frege failed to show when two sets of truth-conditions are equivalent [Frege, by Potter]
The meaning (reference) of a sentence is its truth value - the circumstance of it being true or false [Frege]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
Holism says all language use is also a change in the rules of language [Frege, by Dummett]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
The reference of a word should be understood as part of the reference of the sentence [Frege]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
Frege's Puzzle: from different semantics we infer different reference for two names with the same reference [Frege, by Fine,K]
Frege's 'sense' is ambiguous, between the meaning of a designator, and how it fixes reference [Kripke on Frege]
Every descriptive name has a sense, but may not have a reference [Frege]
Frege started as anti-realist, but the sense/reference distinction led him to realism [Frege, by Benardete,JA]
The meaning (reference) of 'evening star' is the same as that of 'morning star', but not the sense [Frege]
In maths, there are phrases with a clear sense, but no actual reference [Frege]
We are driven from sense to reference by our desire for truth [Frege]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
Expressions always give ways of thinking of referents, rather than the referents themselves [Frege, by Soames]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
'Sense' gives meaning to non-referring names, and to two expressions for one referent [Frege, by Margolis/Laurence]
Frege was the first to construct a plausible theory of meaning [Frege, by Dummett]
Earlier Frege focuses on content itself; later he became interested in understanding content [Frege, by Dummett]
Frege divided the meaning of a sentence into sense, force and tone [Frege, by Dummett]
Frege uses 'sense' to mean both a designator's meaning, and the way its reference is determined [Kripke on Frege]
Frege explained meaning as sense, semantic value, reference, force and tone [Frege, by Miller,A]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Only experience teaches us about our wills [Hume]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Praise and blame can only be given if an action proceeds from a person's character and disposition [Hume]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
If you deny all necessity and causation, then our character is not responsible for our crime [Hume]
Repentance gets rid of guilt, which shows that responsibility arose from the criminal principles in the mind [Hume]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
No government has ever suffered by being too tolerant of philosophy [Hume]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
We can discover some laws of nature, but never its ultimate principles and causes [Hume]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
A priori it looks as if a cause could have absolutely any effect [Hume]
If a singular effect is studied, its cause can only be inferred from the types of events involved [Hume]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
Hume never even suggests that there is no such thing as causation [Hume, by Strawson,G]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
At first Hume said qualities are the causal entities, but later he said events [Hume, by Davidson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
Hume says we can only know constant conjunctions, not that that's what causation IS [Hume, by Strawson,G]
In both of Hume's definitions, causation is extrinsic to the sequence of events [Psillos on Hume]
Hume's definition of cause as constantly joined thoughts can't cover undiscovered laws [Ayer on Hume]
A cause is either similar events following one another, or an experience always suggesting a second experience [Hume]
It is only when two species of thing are constantly conjoined that we can infer one from the other [Hume]
No causes can be known a priori, but only from experience of constant conjunctions [Hume]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Cause is where if the first object had not been, the second had not existed [Hume]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
In observing causes we can never observe any necessary connections or binding qualities [Hume]
Hume never shows how a strong habit could generate the concept of necessity [Harré/Madden on Hume]
Hume's regularity theory of causation is epistemological; he believed in some sort of natural necessity [Hume, by Strawson,G]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
It can never be a logical contradiction to assert the non-existence of something thought to exist [Hume]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / c. Teleological Proof critique
You can't infer the cause to be any greater than its effect [Hume]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / e. Miracles
A miracle violates laws which have been established by continuous unchanging experience, so should be ignored [Hume]
All experience must be against a supposed miracle, or it wouldn't be called 'a miracle' [Hume]
To establish a miracle the falseness of the evidence must be a greater miracle than the claimed miraculous event [Hume]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
The idea of an infinite, intelligent, wise and good God arises from augmenting the best qualities of our own minds [Hume]