22 ideas
17867 | If a concept is not compact, it will not be presentable to finite minds [Almog] |
17877 | The number series is primitive, not the result of some set theoretic axioms [Almog] |
12756 | Substance is a force for acting and being acted upon [Leibniz] |
17871 | Fregean meanings are analogous to conceptual essence, defining a kind [Almog] |
17866 | Essential definition aims at existence conditions and structural truths [Almog] |
17868 | Surface accounts aren't exhaustive as they always allow unintended twin cases [Almog] |
17872 | Definitionalists rely on snapshot-concepts, instead of on the real processes [Almog] |
17870 | Alien 'tigers' can't be tigers if they are not related to our tigers [Almog] |
17869 | Kripke and Putnam offer an intermediary between real and nominal essences [Almog] |
17876 | Individual essences are just cobbled together classificatory predicates [Almog] |
12755 | Final causes can help with explanations in physics [Leibniz] |
12760 | Something rather like souls (though not intelligent) could be found everywhere [Leibniz] |
17873 | Water must be related to water, just as tigers must be related to tigers [Almog] |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
12759 | There are atoms of substance, but no atoms of bulk or extension [Leibniz] |
12718 | Secondary matter is active and complete; primary matter is passive and incomplete [Leibniz] |
11854 | If there is some trace of God in things, that would explain their natural force [Leibniz] |
17864 | Defining an essence comes no where near giving a thing's nature [Almog] |
17863 | Essences promise to reveal reality, but actually drive us away from it [Almog] |
12758 | It is plausible to think substances contain the same immanent force seen in our free will [Leibniz] |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
19408 | To say that nature or the one universal substance is God is a pernicious doctrine [Leibniz] |