76 ideas
| 5196 | Philosophy is a department of logic [Ayer] |
| 5189 | Philosophers should abandon speculation, as philosophy is wholly critical [Ayer] |
| 7919 | Humeans rejected the a priori synthetic, and so rejected even Kantian metaphysics [Ayer, by Macdonald,C] |
| 5195 | Critics say analysis can only show the parts, and not their distinctive configuration [Ayer] |
| 5179 | Philosophy deals with the questions that scientists do not wish to handle [Ayer] |
| 22309 | An idea can only be like another idea [Berkeley] |
| 4749 | We cannot analyse the concept of 'truth', because it is simply a mark that a sentence is asserted [Ayer] |
| 5202 | Maths and logic are true universally because they are analytic or tautological [Ayer] |
| 6717 | Abstract ideas are impossible [Berkeley] |
| 6523 | Positivists regard ontology as either meaningless or stipulated [Ayer, by Robinson,H] |
| 18876 | Berkeley does believe in trees, but is confused about what trees are [Berkeley, by Cameron] |
| 6715 | Universals do not have single meaning, but attach to many different particulars [Berkeley] |
| 6719 | No one will think of abstractions if they only have particular ideas [Berkeley] |
| 6714 | Universals do not have any intrinsic properties, but only relations to particulars [Berkeley] |
| 6729 | Material substance is just general existence which can have properties [Berkeley] |
| 16636 | A die has no distinct subject, but is merely a name for its modes or accidents [Berkeley] |
| 5183 | Only tautologies can be certain; other propositions can only be probable [Ayer] |
| 6722 | Perception is existence for my table, but also possible perception, by me or a spirit [Berkeley] |
| 6525 | Logical positivists could never give the sense-data equivalent of 'there is a table next door' [Robinson,H on Ayer] |
| 5170 | Material things are constructions from actual and possible occurrences of sense-contents [Ayer] |
| 6723 | The 'esse' of objects is 'percipi', and they can only exist in minds [Berkeley] |
| 6732 | When I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but in another mind [Berkeley] |
| 6724 | The only substance is spirit, or that which perceives [Berkeley] |
| 5198 | We could verify 'a thing can't be in two places at once' by destroying one of the things [Ierubino on Ayer] |
| 2619 | Whether geometry can be applied to reality is an empirical question outside of geometry [Ayer] |
| 5197 | By changing definitions we could make 'a thing can't be in two places at once' a contradiction [Ayer] |
| 5204 | To say that a proposition is true a priori is to say that it is a tautology [Ayer] |
| 6726 | No one can, by abstraction, conceive extension and motion of bodies without sensible qualities [Berkeley] |
| 6728 | Motion is in the mind, since swifter ideas produce an appearance of slower motion [Berkeley] |
| 6727 | Figure and extension seem just as dependent on the observer as heat and cold [Berkeley] |
| 6495 | Berkeley's idealism resulted from fear of scepticism in representative realism [Robinson,H on Berkeley] |
| 6524 | Positivists prefer sense-data to objects, because the vocabulary covers both illusions and perceptions [Ayer, by Robinson,H] |
| 5193 | Causal and representative theories of perception are wrong as they refer to unobservables [Ayer] |
| 5200 | The main claim of rationalism is that thought is an independent source of knowledge [Ayer] |
| 6720 | Knowledge is of ideas from senses, or ideas of the mind, or operations on sensations [Berkeley] |
| 4729 | Empiricism lacked a decent account of the a priori, until Ayer said it was entirely analytic [O'Grady on Ayer] |
| 5180 | All propositions (especially 'metaphysics') must begin with the senses [Ayer] |
| 5169 | My empiricism logically distinguishes analytic and synthetic propositions, and metaphysical verbiage [Ayer] |
| 5185 | It is further sense-experience which informs us of the mistakes that arise out of sense-experience [Ayer] |
| 5199 | Empiricism, it is said, cannot account for our knowledge of necessary truths [Ayer] |
| 5190 | The induction problem is to prove generalisations about the future based on the past [Ayer] |
| 5191 | We can't use the uniformity of nature to prove induction, as that would be circular [Ayer] |
| 23636 | Berkeley's idealism gives no grounds for believing in other minds [Reid on Berkeley] |
| 5177 | Other minds are 'metaphysical' objects, because I can never observe their experiences [Ayer] |
| 6736 | I know other minds by ideas which are referred by me to other agents, as their effects [Berkeley] |
| 5178 | A conscious object is by definition one that behaves in a certain way, so behaviour proves consciousness [Ayer] |
| 6713 | If animals have ideas, and are not machines, they must have some reason [Berkeley] |
| 6491 | Berkeley replaced intentionality with an anti-abstractionist imagist theory of thought [Berkeley, by Robinson,H] |
| 6711 | The mind creates abstract ideas by considering qualities separated from their objects [Berkeley] |
| 10581 | I can only combine particulars in imagination; I can't create 'abstract' ideas [Berkeley] |
| 5172 | If the self is meaningful, it must be constructed from sense-experiences [Ayer] |
| 5173 | Two experiences belong to one self if their contents belong with one body [Ayer] |
| 5176 | Empiricists can define personal identity as bodily identity, which consists of sense-contents [Ayer] |
| 6721 | Ideas are perceived by the mind, soul or self [Berkeley] |
| 5171 | The supposed 'gulf' between mind and matter is based on the senseless concept of 'substances' [Ayer] |
| 6716 | Language is presumably for communication, and names stand for ideas [Berkeley] |
| 5181 | A sentence is factually significant to someone if they know how to verify its proposition [Ayer] |
| 5184 | Factual propositions imply (in conjunction with a few other premises) possible experiences [Ayer] |
| 5186 | Tautologies and empirical hypotheses form the entire class of significant propositions [Ayer] |
| 6718 | I can't really go wrong if I stick to wordless thought [Berkeley] |
| 5205 | Moral intuition is worthless if there is no criterion to decide between intuitions [Ayer] |
| 23725 | Ayer defends the emotivist version of expressivism [Ayer, by Smith,M] |
| 5206 | To say an act is wrong makes no further statement about it, but merely expresses disapproval [Ayer] |
| 13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
| 6731 | No one can explain how matter affects mind, so matter is redundant in philosophy [Berkeley] |
| 6730 | We discover natural behaviour by observing settled laws of nature, not necessary connections [Berkeley] |
| 15861 | The laws of nature are mental regularities which we learn by experience [Berkeley] |
| 6734 | If properties and qualities arise from an inward essence, we will remain ignorant of nature [Berkeley] |
| 6735 | All motion is relative, so a single body cannot move [Berkeley] |
| 6733 | I cannot imagine time apart from the flow of ideas in my mind [Berkeley] |
| 20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
| 5208 | A person with non-empirical attributes is unintelligible. [Ayer] |
| 5187 | When we ascribe an attribute to a thing, we covertly assert that it exists [Ayer] |
| 5207 | If theism is non-sensical, then so is atheism. [Ayer] |
| 5209 | The 'truths' expressed by theists are not literally significant [Ayer] |
| 6737 | Particular evils are really good when linked to the whole system of beings [Berkeley] |