Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'What is Philosophy?' and 'Reference and Definite Descriptions'

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24 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
8220 Philosophy is in a perpetual state of digression [Deleuze/Guattari]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
8217 Philosophy is a concept-creating discipline [Deleuze/Guattari]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
8242 Philosophy aims at what is interesting, remarkable or important - not at knowledge or truth [Deleuze/Guattari]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
8223 The plague of philosophy is those who criticise without creating, and defend dead concepts [Deleuze/Guattari]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 2. Phenomenology
8247 Phenomenology needs art as logic needs science [Deleuze/Guattari]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 3. Eristic
8224 'Eris' is the divinity of conflict, the opposite of Philia, the god of friendship [Deleuze/Guattari]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
8246 Logic hates philosophy, and wishes to supplant it [Deleuze/Guattari]
8219 Logic has an infantile idea of philosophy [Deleuze/Guattari]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
7760 Russell only uses descriptions attributively, and Strawson only referentially [Donnellan, by Lycan]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
5811 A definite description can have a non-referential use [Donnellan]
5812 Definite descriptions are 'attributive' if they say something about x, and 'referential' if they pick x out [Donnellan]
5814 'The x is F' only presumes that x exists; it does not actually entail the existence [Donnellan]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
8221 We cannot judge the Cogito. Must we begin? Must we start from certainty? Can 'I' relate to thought? [Deleuze/Guattari]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 4. Paradigm
8222 Concepts are superior because they make us more aware, and change our thinking [Deleuze/Guattari]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / a. Other minds
8218 Other people completely revise our perceptions, because they are possible worlds [Deleuze/Guattari]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
8248 Phenomenology says thought is part of the world [Deleuze/Guattari]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
8245 The logical attitude tries to turn concepts into functions, when they are really forms or forces [Deleuze/Guattari]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
10435 A definite description 'the F' is referential if the speaker could thereby be referring to something not-F [Donnellan, by Sainsbury]
10451 Donnellan is unclear whether the referential-attributive distinction is semantic or pragmatic [Bach on Donnellan]
5813 A description can successfully refer, even if its application to the subject is not believed [Donnellan]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
5815 Whether a definite description is referential or attributive depends on the speaker's intention [Donnellan]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
13304 Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
20820 Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
8243 Atheism is the philosopher's serenity, and philosophy's achievement [Deleuze/Guattari]