35 ideas
| 8472 | Sentential logic is consistent (no contradictions) and complete (entirely provable) [Orenstein] |
| 8476 | Axiomatization simply picks from among the true sentences a few to play a special role [Orenstein] |
| 8480 | S4: 'poss that poss that p' implies 'poss that p'; S5: 'poss that nec that p' implies 'nec that p' [Orenstein] |
| 8474 | Unlike elementary logic, set theory is not complete [Orenstein] |
| 10405 | In the iterative conception of sets, they form a natural hierarchy [Swoyer] |
| 8465 | Mereology has been exploited by some nominalists to achieve the effects of set theory [Orenstein] |
| 10407 | Logical Form explains differing logical behaviour of similar sentences [Swoyer] |
| 8452 | Traditionally, universal sentences had existential import, but were later treated as conditional claims [Orenstein] |
| 8475 | The substitution view of quantification says a sentence is true when there is a substitution instance [Orenstein] |
| 8454 | The whole numbers are 'natural'; 'rational' numbers include fractions; the 'reals' include root-2 etc. [Orenstein] |
| 8473 | The logicists held that is-a-member-of is a logical constant, making set theory part of logic [Orenstein] |
| 10421 | Supervenience is nowadays seen as between properties, rather than linguistic [Swoyer] |
| 10410 | Anti-realists can't explain different methods to measure distance [Swoyer] |
| 8458 | Just individuals in Nominalism; add sets for Extensionalism; add properties, concepts etc for Intensionalism [Orenstein] |
| 10399 | If a property such as self-identity can only be in one thing, it can't be a universal [Swoyer] |
| 10416 | Can properties have parts? [Swoyer] |
| 10417 | There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured') [Swoyer] |
| 10413 | The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness [Swoyer] |
| 10402 | Various attempts are made to evade universals being wholly present in different places [Swoyer] |
| 10400 | Conceptualism says words like 'honesty' refer to concepts, not to properties [Swoyer] |
| 10403 | If properties are abstract objects, then their being abstract exemplifies being abstract [Swoyer] |
| 10406 | One might hope to reduce possible worlds to properties [Swoyer] |
| 10404 | Extreme empiricists can hardly explain anything [Swoyer] |
| 8457 | The Principle of Conservatism says we should violate the minimum number of background beliefs [Orenstein] |
| 10408 | Intensions are functions which map possible worlds to sets of things denoted by an expression [Swoyer] |
| 10409 | Research suggests that concepts rely on typical examples [Swoyer] |
| 8477 | People presume meanings exist because they confuse meaning and reference [Orenstein] |
| 10401 | The F and G of logic cover a huge range of natural language combinations [Swoyer] |
| 8471 | Three ways for 'Socrates is human' to be true are nominalist, platonist, or Montague's way [Orenstein] |
| 10420 | Maybe a proposition is just a property with all its places filled [Swoyer] |
| 8484 | If two people believe the same proposition, this implies the existence of propositions [Orenstein] |
| 13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
| 10412 | If laws are mere regularities, they give no grounds for future prediction [Swoyer] |
| 10411 | Two properties can have one power, and one property can have two powers [Swoyer] |
| 20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |