18 ideas
18005 | Philosophy aims to become more disciplined about categories [Ryle] |
6402 | In 1927, Russell analysed force and matter in terms of events [Russell, by Grayling] |
14297 | A dispositional property is not a state, but a liability to be in some state, given a condition [Ryle] |
14300 | No physical scientist now believes in an occult force-exerting agency [Ryle] |
14732 | A perceived physical object is events grouped around a centre [Russell] |
14733 | An object produces the same percepts with or without a substance, so that is irrelevant to science [Russell] |
6418 | Russell rejected phenomenalism because it couldn't account for causal relations [Russell, by Grayling] |
2622 | Can one movement have a mental and physical cause? [Ryle] |
1353 | Reporting on myself has the same problems as reporting on you [Ryle] |
1354 | We cannot introspect states of anger or panic [Ryle] |
2624 | I cannot prepare myself for the next thought I am going to think [Ryle] |
2620 | Dualism is a category mistake [Ryle] |
2388 | Behaviour depends on desires as well as beliefs [Chalmers on Ryle] |
3354 | You can't explain mind as dispositions, if they aren't real [Benardete,JA on Ryle] |
2387 | How can behaviour be the cause of behaviour? [Chalmers on Ryle] |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
21706 | At first matter is basic and known by sense-data; later Russell says matter is constructed [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |