Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Ordinary Objects' and 'The Structure of Objects'

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45 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Maybe analytic truths do not require truth-makers, as they place no demands on the world [Thomasson]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
The 'aggregative' objections says mereology gets existence and location of objects wrong [Koslicki]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Consequence is truth-preserving, either despite substitutions, or in all interpretations [Koslicki]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
'Roses are red; therefore, roses are colored' seems truth-preserving, but not valid in a system [Koslicki]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 6. Entailment
Analytical entailments arise from combinations of meanings and inference rules [Thomasson]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
Some questions concern mathematical entities, rather than whole structures [Koslicki]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Existence might require playing a role in explanation, or in a causal story, or being composed in some way [Thomasson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
Rival ontological claims can both be true, if there are analytic relationships between them [Thomasson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
Theories do not avoid commitment to entities by avoiding certain terms or concepts [Thomasson]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 3. Structural Relations
Structures have positions, constituent types and number, and some invariable parts [Koslicki]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
'Categorical' properties exist in the actual world, and 'hypothetical' properties in other worlds [Koslicki]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Ordinary objects may be not indispensable, but they are nearly unavoidable [Thomasson]
The simple existence conditions for objects are established by our practices, and are met [Thomasson]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
It is analytic that if simples are arranged chair-wise, then there is a chair [Thomasson, by Hofweber]
Ordinary objects are rejected, to avoid contradictions, or for greater economy in thought [Thomasson]
To individuate people we need conventions, but conventions are made up by people [Thomasson]
Eliminativists haven't found existence conditions for chairs, beyond those of the word 'chair' [Thomasson]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
I aim to put the notion of structure or form back into the concepts of part, whole and object [Koslicki]
If a whole is just a structure, a dinner party wouldn't need the guests to turn up [Koslicki]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
Wherever an object exists, there are intrinsic properties instantiating every modal profile [Thomasson]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
The clay is just a part of the statue (its matter); the rest consists of its form or structure [Koslicki]
Statue and clay differ in modal and temporal properties, and in constitution [Koslicki]
If the statue and the lump are two objects, they require separate properties, so we could add their masses [Thomasson]
Given the similarity of statue and lump, what could possibly ground their modal properties? [Thomasson]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / c. Form as causal
Structure or form are right at the centre of modern rigorous modes of enquiry [Koslicki]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
There are at least six versions of constitution being identity [Koslicki]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
For three-dimensionalist parthood must be a three-place relation, including times [Koslicki]
The parts may be the same type as the whole, like a building made of buildings [Koslicki]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Wholes in modern mereology are intended to replace sets, so they closely resemble them [Koslicki]
Wholes are entities distinct from their parts, and have different properties [Koslicki]
Wholes are not just their parts; a whole is an entity distinct from the proper parts [Koslicki]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Identity claims between objects are only well-formed if the categories are specified [Thomasson]
Identical entities must be of the same category, and meet the criteria for the category [Thomasson]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
Modal Conventionalism says modality is analytic, not intrinsic to the world, and linguistic [Thomasson]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
A chief task of philosophy is making reflective sense of our common sense worldview [Thomasson]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
How can causal theories of reference handle nonexistence claims? [Thomasson]
Pure causal theories of reference have the 'qua problem', of what sort of things is being referred to [Thomasson]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
Analyticity is revealed through redundancy, as in 'He bought a house and a building' [Thomasson]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
The Kripke/Putnam approach to natural kind terms seems to give them excessive stability [Koslicki]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
Natural kinds support inductive inferences, from previous samples to the next one [Koslicki]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
Concepts for species are either intrinsic structure, or relations like breeding or ancestry [Koslicki]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
Should vernacular classifications ever be counted as natural kind terms? [Koslicki]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
There are apparently no scientific laws concerning biological species [Koslicki]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus]