Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Semantic Conception of Truth' and 'On the Heavens'

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38 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Some say metaphysics is a highly generalised empirical study of objects [Tarski]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Disputes that fail to use precise scientific terminology are all meaningless [Tarski]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
A very hungry man cannot choose between equidistant piles of food [Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
For a definition we need the words or concepts used, the rules, and the structure of the language [Tarski]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Definitions of truth should not introduce a new version of the concept, but capture the old one [Tarski]
A definition of truth should be materially adequate and formally correct [Tarski]
A rigorous definition of truth is only possible in an exactly specified language [Tarski]
We may eventually need to split the word 'true' into several less ambiguous terms [Tarski]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
It is convenient to attach 'true' to sentences, and hence the language must be specified [Tarski]
In the classical concept of truth, 'snow is white' is true if snow is white [Tarski]
Scheme (T) is not a definition of truth [Tarski]
Each interpreted T-sentence is a partial definition of truth; the whole definition is their conjunction [Tarski]
Use 'true' so that all T-sentences can be asserted, and the definition will then be 'adequate' [Tarski]
We don't give conditions for asserting 'snow is white'; just that assertion implies 'snow is white' is true [Tarski]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
The best truth definition involves other semantic notions, like satisfaction (relating terms and objects) [Tarski]
Specify satisfaction for simple sentences, then compounds; true sentences are satisfied by all objects [Tarski]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
We can't use a semantically closed language, or ditch our logic, so a meta-language is needed [Tarski]
The metalanguage must contain the object language, logic, and defined semantics [Tarski]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
If listing equivalences is a reduction of truth, witchcraft is just a list of witch-victim pairs [Field,H on Tarski]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
We need an undefined term 'true' in the meta-language, specified by axioms [Tarski]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
Truth can't be eliminated from universal claims, or from particular unspecified claims [Tarski]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Semantics is a very modest discipline which solves no real problems [Tarski]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 3. Truth Tables
Truth tables give prior conditions for logic, but are outside the system, and not definitions [Tarski]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
The truth definition proves semantic contradiction and excluded middle laws (not the logic laws) [Tarski]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
The Liar makes us assert a false sentence, so it must be taken seriously [Tarski]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / b. Successful function
Each thing that has a function is for the sake of that function [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
An unworn sandal is in vain, but nothing in nature is in vain [Aristotle]
There has to be some goal, and not just movement to infinity [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
Aether moves in circles and is imperishable; the four elements perish, and move in straight lines [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
An element is what bodies are analysed into, and won't itself divide into something else [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
If the more you raise some earth the faster it moves, why does the whole earth not move? [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 1. Void
Void is a kind of place, so it can't explain place [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
The earth must be round and of limited size, because moving north or south makes different stars visible [Aristotle]
The Earth must be spherical, because it casts a convex shadow on the moon [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 3. The Beginning
Everyone agrees that the world had a beginning, but thinkers disagree over whether it will end [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 10. Multiverse
It seems possible that there exists a limited number of other worlds apart from this one [Aristotle]