13 ideas
10779 | A comprehension axiom is 'predicative' if the formula has no bound second-order variables [Linnebo] |
10781 | A 'pure logic' must be ontologically innocent, universal, and without presuppositions [Linnebo] |
10783 | Plural quantification depends too heavily on combinatorial and set-theoretic considerations [Linnebo] |
10778 | Can second-order logic be ontologically first-order, with all the benefits of second-order? [Linnebo] |
14664 | Necessary beings (numbers, properties, sets, propositions, states of affairs, God) exist in all possible worlds [Plantinga] |
10782 | The modern concept of an object is rooted in quantificational logic [Linnebo] |
14666 | Socrates is a contingent being, but his essence is not; without Socrates, his essence is unexemplified [Plantinga] |
14662 | Possible worlds clarify possibility, propositions, properties, sets, counterfacts, time, determinism etc. [Plantinga] |
16472 | Plantinga's actualism is nominal, because he fills actuality with possibilia [Stalnaker on Plantinga] |
16469 | Plantinga has domains of sets of essences, variables denoting essences, and predicates as functions [Plantinga, by Stalnaker] |
16470 | Plantinga's essences have their own properties - so will have essences, giving a hierarchy [Stalnaker on Plantinga] |
14663 | Are propositions and states of affairs two separate things, or only one? I incline to say one [Plantinga] |
1590 | The just man does not harm his enemies, but benefits everyone [Plato] |