Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Theaetetus', 'Sapiens: brief history of humankind' and 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism'

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91 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 5. Later European Thought
The Scientific Revolution was the discovery of our own ignorance [Harari]
For millenia people didn't know how to convert one type of energy into another [Harari]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophers are always switching direction to something more interesting [Plato]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Any statement can be held true if we make enough adjustment to the rest of the system [Quine]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Analysis by Division
Understanding mainly involves knowing the elements, not their combinations [Plato]
Either a syllable is its letters (making parts as knowable as whole) or it isn't (meaning it has no parts) [Plato]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
A rational account is essentially a weaving together of things with names [Plato]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 3. Eristic
Eristic discussion is aggressive, but dialectic aims to help one's companions in discussion [Plato]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
Definition rests on synonymy, rather than explaining it [Quine]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
A primary element has only a name, and no logos, but complexes have an account, by weaving the names [Plato]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / f. Names eliminated
Quine's arguments fail because he naively conflates names with descriptions [Fine,K on Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
We master arithmetic by knowing all the numbers in our soul [Plato]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Quine blurs the difference between knowledge of arithmetic and of physics [Jenkins on Quine]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
There seem to be two sorts of change: alteration and motion [Plato]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
Quine is hopeless circular, deriving ontology from what is literal, and 'literal' from good ontology [Yablo on Quine]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
If physical objects are a myth, they are useful for making sense of experience [Quine]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
If a word has no parts and has a single identity, it turns out to be the same kind of thing as a letter [Plato]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
A sum is that from which nothing is lacking, which is a whole [Plato]
The whole can't be the parts, because it would be all of the parts, which is the whole [Plato]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Aristotelian essence of the object has become the modern essence of meaning [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Contrary to some claims, Quine does not deny logical necessity [Quine, by McFetridge]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Quine's attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction undermined necessary truths [Quine, by Shoemaker]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Things are only knowable if a rational account (logos) is possible [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Expertise is knowledge of the whole by means of the parts [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
It is impossible to believe something which is held to be false [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
How can a belief exist if its object doesn't exist? [Plato]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
Metaphysical analyticity (and linguistic necessity) are hopeless, but epistemic analyticity is a priori [Boghossian on Quine]
Quine challenges the claim that analytic truths are knowable a priori [Quine, by Kitcher]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
Quine's objections to a priori knowledge only work in the domain of science [Horwich on Quine]
Science is empirical, simple and conservative; any belief can hence be abandoned; so no a priori [Quine, by Horwich]
Logic, arithmetic and geometry are revisable and a posteriori; quantum logic could be right [Horwich on Quine]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Perception is infallible, suggesting that it is knowledge [Plato]
Our senses could have been separate, but they converge on one mind [Plato]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
With what physical faculty do we perceive pairs of opposed abstract qualities? [Plato]
You might mistake eleven for twelve in your senses, but not in your mind [Plato]
Thought must grasp being itself before truth becomes possible [Plato]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Our outer beliefs must match experience, and our inner ones must be simple [Quine]
Empiricism makes a basic distinction between truths based or not based on facts [Quine]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
The second dogma is linking every statement to some determinate observations [Quine, by Yablo]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
An inadequate rational account would still not justify knowledge [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Parts and wholes are either equally knowable or equally unknowable [Plato]
Without distinguishing marks, how do I know what my beliefs are about? [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
A rational account might be seeing an image of one's belief, like a reflection in a mirror [Plato]
A rational account involves giving an image, or analysis, or giving a differentiating mark [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
Maybe primary elements can be named, but not receive a rational account [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
A rational account of a wagon would mean knowledge of its hundred parts [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 5. Dream Scepticism
What evidence can be brought to show whether we are dreaming or not? [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
If you claim that all beliefs are true, that includes beliefs opposed to your own [Plato]
How can a relativist form opinions about what will happen in the future? [Plato]
Clearly some people are superior to others when it comes to medicine [Plato]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 6. Theory Holism
Statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience as a corporate body [Quine]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
It is troublesome nonsense to split statements into a linguistic and a factual component [Quine]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
'Renate' and 'cordate' have identical extensions, but are not synonymous [Quine, by Miller,A]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
Once meaning and reference are separated, meaning ceases to seem important [Quine]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
Analytic statements are either logical truths (all reinterpretations) or they depend on synonymy [Quine]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
Did someone ever actually define 'bachelor' as 'unmarried man'? [Quine]
Quine's attack on analyticity undermined linguistic views of necessity, and analytic views of the a priori [Quine, by Boghossian]
Quine attacks the Fregean idea that we can define analyticity through synonyous substitution [Quine, by Thomasson]
The last two parts of 'Two Dogmas' are much the best [Miller,A on Quine]
Erasing the analytic/synthetic distinction got rid of meanings, and saved philosophy of language [Davidson on Quine]
The analytic needs excessively small units of meaning and empirical confirmation [Quine, by Jenkins]
If we try to define analyticity by synonymy, that leads back to analyticity [Quine]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
Money does produce happiness, but only up to a point [Harari]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
If a group is bound by gossip, the natural size is 150 people [Harari]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 2. Population / a. Human population
Since 1500 human population has increased fourteenfold, and consumption far more [Harari]
People 300m tons; domesticated animals 700m tons; larger wild animals 100m tons [Harari]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
The Nazi aim was to encourage progressive evolution, and avoid degeneration [Harari]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
We stabilise societies with dogmas, either of dubious science, or of non-scientific values [Harari]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
The state fostered individualism, to break the power of family and community [Harari]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
In 1750 losing your family and community meant death [Harari]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 11. Capitalism
The sacred command of capitalism is that profits must be used to increase production [Harari]
The main rule of capitalism is that all other goods depend on economic growth [Harari]
The progress of capitalism depends entirely on the new discoveries and gadgets of science [Harari]
In capitalism the rich invest, and the rest of us go shopping [Harari]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 4. Free market
No market is free of political bias, and markets need protection of their freedoms [Harari]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Freedom may work against us, as individuals can choose to leave, and make fewer commitments [Harari]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / e. Peace
Real peace is the implausibility of war (and not just its absence) [Harari]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 4. Taxation
Financing is increasingly through credit rather than taxes; people prefer investing to taxation [Harari]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
The more you know about history, the harder it becomes to explain [Harari]
History teaches us that the present was not inevitable, and shows us the possibilities [Harari]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
God must be the epitome of goodness, and we can only approach a divine state by being as good as possible [Plato]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 1. Monotheism
In order to explain both order and evil, a single evil creator is best, but no one favours that [Harari]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 1. Animism
Animism is belief that every part of nature is aware and feeling, and can communicate [Harari]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
Most polytheist recognise one supreme power or law, behind the various gods [Harari]
Polytheism is open-minded, and rarely persecutes opponents [Harari]
Mythologies are usual contracts with the gods, exchanging devotion for control of nature [Harari]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 4. Dualist Religion
Dualist religions see everything as a battleground of good and evil forces [Harari]
Dualist religions say the cosmos is a battleground, so can’t explain its order [Harari]
Manichaeans and Gnostics: good made spirit, evil made flesh [Harari]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 1. Monotheistic Religion
Monotheism appeared in Egypt in 1350 BCE, when the god Aten was declared supreme [Harari]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
There must always be some force of evil ranged against good [Plato]